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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Agency problems are ubiquitous in corporate finance literature and a continuous
concern for corporate America. Thus, compensation contracts for CEOs and corporate
managers are commonly designed to encourage these agents to act in the best interests of
shareholders. Interestingly, there is empirical evidence that compensation practices vary
across industries. For example, Ittner, Lambert, and Lacker (2003) document that the use
of stock options and restricted stock in high-tech, new-economy firms substantially
exceeds the equity compensation in large, old-economy manufacturing firms. Murphy
(2003) and Bryan and Hwang (2000) state that the use of managerial stock options is
extremely common, but options are used less frequently in highly regulated utility
industries. This implies that direct monitoring by regulators reduces the need for CEO
stock option awards.
Building on the results in Bryan and Hwang (2000), this dissertation focuses on
the highly regulated Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT) industry. In order to maintain
their federal tax-exempt status, REITs must meet several conditions. First, they must
distribute 90 percent of taxable income as dividends. Second, qualified REITs must have
at least 100 shareholders while adhering to the five or fewer rule, a prohibition against
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five or fewer shareholders owning 50 percent or more of the shares. Third, they must
have at least 75 percent of their assets invested in real estate oriented investments, cash,
and/or government securities. Finally, they must generate at least 75 percent of their
income from rent, mortgages, and the sale of property. Given the fact that they are highly
regulated financial firms yet pay substantial incentive-based compensation, REITs should
provide an interesting laboratory to investigate performance-based managerial
compensation.
For the purpose of this study, incentive-based compensation is defined as longterm compensation including stock options, restricted stock, and long-term incentive plan
awards. It is different from equity based compensation because incentive-based
compensation includes long term incentive plans whose payoff is not necessarily equity.
For instance, long term incentive plans (LTIPs) include specific compensation once set
performance goals are attained for a period longer than one fiscal year from the date of
the award. The performance measure can be in terms of accounting ratios or equity
prices, and the actual payoff can be in cash, equity, or a combination thereof. Incentivebased compensation is also different from performance-based compensation because
incentive-based compensation is forward-looking; thus, it refers to compensation
awarded to CEOs as incentive for long-term future executive performance.
In contrast to the large amount of research conducted on CEO compensation for
typical corporate firms and despite the growing usage of different incentive compensation
vehicles in CEOs compensation contracts, the topic of incentive based compensation has
yet to be fully examined in the context of REITs. There are many reasons for this void in
the real estate literature. Most notably, limitations on data availability may have led most
2

previous REIT studies to focus on cash and total compensation 1 rather than on incentivebased compensation, or even equity-based compensation.
This dissertation contributes to the literature by addressing three previously
unexplored topics in the REIT managerial compensation research. First, the relation
between incentive-based compensation and subsequent performance is determined. The
alignment of interest hypothesis states that managerial remuneration is a device used to
align the interests of shareholders and, thus, suggests a positive relation between
compensation and subsequent performance. By using panel-data econometric techniques
in balanced and unbalanced panel datasets for the period 1999-2003, it is tested the
impact of incentive-based compensation on one and three-year subsequent performance
as measured by ROA and stock returns.
Second, it is analyzed how various economic variables and monitoring
mechanisms impact the decision to pay incentive-based compensation using a logistic
fixed-effect regression methodology.
Third, the determinants of incentive-based compensation are examined. While the
determinants of total and cash compensation have been directly examined in the context
of REITs, the literature had not yet specifically examined what determines the level of
incentive-based compensation paid to REIT CEOs. Given the strict nature of the
regulatory requirements for firms that elect REIT status, it is reasonable to assume that

1

Ghosh and Sirmans (2005) work on the effect of board structure on CEO compensation and find that CEO
compensation is higher when the board of directors are not independent and are subject to CEO influence.
Hardin (1998) works on the determinants of cash compensation and finds that a REITs size, type, and the
number of years since IPOs took place are all positively related to cash compensation, while the dividend
cash flow to senior executive is negatively related. Chopin et al (1995) analyzes the relation between a
CEO’s total compensation and sales and profits (as performance measures) and finds a positive relation
between sales and compensation, but little impact of profits on compensation.
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these regulations affect REIT corporate governance mechanisms and thus affect the need
for and level of incentive-based compensation. For example, Campbell, Ghosh, and
Sirmans (2001) attribute the lack of hostile takeovers among REITs to their regulatory
environment. They argue that the disperse ownership for REITs, resulting from the five
or fewer rule, diminishes the effectiveness of monitoring by the market for corporate
control and makes board and other monitoring mechanisms more critical. On the other
hand, if regulations limit managerial discretion over corporate decision making, a
corporate governance is likely to be less critical.
Using Ghosh and Sirmans (2005) as a guide, the determinants of incentive-based
compensation in light of the structure of the board of directors, CEO ownership, the level
of debt contracting, institutional holdings, and other factors, such as firm size, investment
opportunities, prior year performance, and other economic determinants are examined.
However, this study refines Ghosh and Sirmans’ (2005) study by examining the effect of
institutional ownership rather than that of blockholder ownership. Although blockholders
may be effective monitors of management, generally by exerting hostile takeovers
(Gorton and Kahl, 1999), blockholders are limited in the REIT industry because of the
five or fewer rule. In contrast, institutional shareholders are not subject to the same rule,
are permanent block holders, and can provide some monitoring of management. To
address endogeneity concerns, a two-stage least squares procedure is used for the period
of 1999-2003, where compensation, performance, and CEO ownership are treated as
endogenous variables.
This study supplements Pennathur, Gilley, and Shelor’s (2005) results in the
determinants of option awards. They find a negative relation between changes in stock
4

returns and option awards, and they also find a negative relation between stock returns
and the options award mix, or ratio of awarded stock options to cash compensation. They
suggest that such findings may be due to the fact that their sample covers the period
of1997-2000, and during the years of 1998 and 1999, REITs experienced negative
returns, most likely due to investor preference for high-tech companies’ stocks at the
time. Therefore, to the extent that their findings may be driven by the market conditions
of that time, their results may not be robust. In contrast, this study analyzes the
determinants of incentive-based compensation for the generally REIT friendly time span
of January 1, 1999, through December 31, 2003, as indicated by the NAREIT index
level 2 .
This research effort also complements Delcoure’s (2005) work. She analyzes
executive compensation in terms of salary, bonus, and long-term compensation for 32
REITs between 1999 and 2001 and finds a positive relation between long-term
compensation and CEO stock ownership and volatility of funds from operations (FFO).
Also, she finds a negative relation between long-term compensation and institutional
ownership. Her results support both the “passing-the-baton” hypothesis and the
“substitute” hypothesis. The “passing-the-baton” hypothesis states that boards under the
influence of CEOs award larger compensation, whereas the “substitute” hypothesis states
that monitoring by boards, in the presence of other monitoring mechanisms, makes
incentive compensation less needed and, thus, lower. Although very similar to this study
where Delcoure’s (2005) analyzes the determinants of the different forms of REIT CEO

2

The levels of the NAREIT composite index were 1,099 (year 1998), 1,019.39 (year 1999), 1,288.51 (year
2000) in accordance to NAREIT and 1,494.65 (year 2001), 1,572.61 (year 2002), 2,177.53 (year 2003),
2,839.7 (year 2004) in accordance to FTSE NAREIT
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compensation, her study has several issues addressed here. First, her long-term
compensation measure does not include the value of stock options granted in any given
year. Second, her results may not be reliable due to the relatively small sample size of
only 32 firms. Third, she ignores important determinants of compensation cited by Ghosh
and Sirmans (2005), such as firm size, previous year performance, and the structure of
the board of directors. Fourth, her econometric models do not address the simultaneity
between CEO ownership and compensation.
To summarize the findings of this dissertation, contrary to the expectations, it did
not find a positive relation between compensation and subsequent performance. Instead, a
negative relation between incentive-based compensation and subsequent stock return was
obtained. Interestingly, such relation is not found when ROA is the measure of
performance. The partial result for the case of stock returns is consistent with the findings
of Pennathur, Gilley, and Shelor (2005) in the relation between change in stock returns
and stock option awards but inconsistent with agency theory and other findings, Ryan and
Wiggins (2000) and Scott, Anderson, and Loviscek (2001). Clearly, incentive-based
compensation is not an effective bonding mechanism for REIT CEOs since it is not
enhancing REIT performance. Finally, as far as the determinants of incentive based
compensation, the study finds that CEO ownership, whether the CEO chairs the board or
not, board size, and institutional ownership are consistent determinants of the level of
incentive based compensation awarded to REITs CEOs. In addition, the study finds that
retail, industrial, mixed, and health care REITs pay more incentive-based compensation
to their CEOs than self-storage REITs do.

6

The remainder of this dissertation proceeds as follows. Chapters 2 and 3
investigate the current research in the area of REIT executive compensation. Chapter 2
examines the major theories explaining the relation between managerial compensation
and firm performance. Also, the empirical evidence supporting or rejecting these theories
is discussed. Chapter 3 presents the theories surrounding the determinants of executive
compensation, the empirical evidence on these theories as presented in corporate finance
and REIT literature, and the testable hypotheses. Chapter 4 presents the data and provides
details on the empirical models. Chapter 5 presents the results on the relation between
incentive-based compensation and REIT performance. Chapter 6 presents the results for
the decision to pay and determinants of incentive-based compensation. Chapter 7
provides the dissertation conclusion. Please note, in accordance with Mississippi State
University policies on dissertations, all tables and figures are grouped at the end of the
chapter in which they are first cited in the text.
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CHAPTER 2
COMPENSATION AND FIRM PERFORMANCE

This chapter discusses the literature and empirical evidence on the relation
between CEO compensation and firm performance. In addition, it develops the research
hypothesis for testing such relation. Section 2.1 discusses the relevant literature for
REITs.
As originally described by Jensen and Meckling (1976), the traditional principalagent problem found in the agency theory literature is based on the situation where a
CEO has incentives and goals that are in direct conflict with the best interests of
shareholders. Compensation schemes are one of several mechanisms employed to
alleviate such situations. Agency theory states that when managerial actions are
unobservable, optimal incentive contracts are needed to link the manager’s wealth to firm
value in order to induce managers to behave in the best interest of shareholders.
However, empirical evidence shows that not all forms of compensation provide effective
alignment incentives.
Studying the pay-performance sensitivity of CEO wealth, Jensen and Murphy
(1990) and Hall and Liebman (1998) demonstrate that cash compensation is a poor
alignment mechanism. First, Jensen and Murphy (1990) examine the 1974–1988 period
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and find a median change in CEO wealth of $2.59 per $1,000 change in shareholder
wealth, or approximately 0.26 percent. Using a more recent sample period of 1980–1994,
Hall and Liebman (1998) find that cash compensation sensitivity to performance is 0.22.
Thus, they show that CEO cash compensation, defined as annual salary plus cash bonus,
and firm performance are somewhat dissociated. They conclude that cash compensation
does not provide alignment incentive for managers to act in the best interest of
shareholders.
In contrast to the results for cash compensation, researchers have found a stronger
link between performance and stock-based compensation. Hall and Liebman (1998),
Lewellen, Loderer, and Martin (1987), and Core, Guay, and Lacker (2003) suggest that
equity-based compensation vehicles are more appropriate to provide alignment incentive
to CEOs. Hall and Liebman (1998) find that CEO ownership and stock options create a
strong link between firm performance and changes in CEO wealth. The reasons are
simple. Salary compensation is paid regardless of firm performance. If shareholders want
performance, they must tie CEO compensation directly to performance, typically, stock
performance for long-term incentive compensation or accounting performance for annual
bonus. This also seems to be understood outside of academic circles. In fact, Hall and
Liebman (1998) find that stock options constitute an important fraction of total
compensation in their sample. For instance, the mean value of stock options granted was
about 25 percent of the total direct compensation during the period of 1982–1984, but it
increased to approximately 50 percent of total direct compensation a decade later, 1992–
1994. In short, from Jensen and Murphy (1990) and Hall and Liebman (1998), one can
conclude that it is how CEOs are paid, not how much they are paid, that matters.
9

There are relevant considerations regarding the usage of incentive compensation
as an alignment mechanism, though. First, as noted by Stammerjohan (2004), equitybased compensation appears to encourage short-term rather than long-term performance,
a non-maximizing shareholder wealth practice. Second, researchers have argued that the
design of executive compensation creates its own agency problems. For example,
Bebchuk and Fried (2003) state that due to the dispersed ownership of publicly traded
companies, managers do have influence over their own pay arrangements and use that
power to favor weak and even perverse incentives. Jensen (2005) mentions that the usage
of equity-based compensation has exacerbated the agency costs of overvalued equity, a
value destruction practice. Efendi, Srivastava, and Swanson (2004) provide empirical
support to these hypotheses. However, Thatcher (2005) provides a less radical
explanation for the existence of imperfect incentive compensation schemes. She suggests
that companies may have been historically unable to use better performance incentives
simply because of their accounting treatment under Accounting Principles Board opinion
number 25 (APB 25) and the challenge of designing meaningful and understandable
performance objectives for the awards
Continued research on compensation is needed for two important reasons. First,
boards can choose incentive remuneration vehicles rather than equity-based
compensation vehicles. For instance, long-term performance plans can be distributed in
cash, equity, or any combination thereof. In these cases, it is important to assess the
efficiency of these alternative forms of incentive compensation. Second, compensation
practices change across time. For example, stock options have been extremely popular
over the last two decades due to their favorable accounting treatment. However, this
10

artificial bias in favor of stock options is likely to disappear with the mandatory
expensing of stock options that became effective in January 2006. As noted by Thatcher
(2005), other forms of incentive-based compensation, such as restricted stock, have
become increasingly popular in CEO compensation contracts for both REITs and nonREITs.
Given that firms will potentially switch among incentive vehicles in response to
specific performance goals or changes in rules and regulations, this study concentrates on
incentive-based compensation rather than on equity-based compensation. Equity based
compensation studies focus solely on stock options, restricted stock, or a combination
thereof. Both equity based compensation and LTIPs, designed as an alignment
mechanism under the agency theory framework, have been widely studied for nonREITs, but the determinants of incentive-based compensation for REIT CEOs and its
effect on REIT performance remain a timely empirical question. Therefore, this study
examines the relation between incentive-based compensation and REIT performance.
There is empirical evidence in the relation between some forms of incentivebased compensation and performance for non-REITs. Mehran (1995) examines the
relation between CEO equity-based compensation, stock ownership, and firm
performance. He finds that performance is positively related to both equity-based
compensation and insider ownership. More recently, Stammerjohan (2004) examines the
relation between different forms of compensation and subsequent (1, 3, and 5-year) stock
returns. He concludes that stock options provide CEOs with incentives for maximizing
firm value in the long-run while annual bonuses, which are short term reward
compensation, are effective short-term incentives.
11

In an agency theory framework, compensation should be structured to serve as an
incentive for managers to act on the best interest of shareholders. Specifically, the
literature provides empirical evidence that distinct types of compensation provide
different incentives to managers. As suggested by Stammerjoham (2004) and Lewellen,
Loderer, and Martin (1987), annual bonuses, which are considered part of cash
compensation in the compensation literature, are intended to be short-term incentives. In
contrast, stock options, restricted stocks, and long-term performance plans are typically
designed as long-term compensation. These types of incentive-based compensation
should alleviate a specific agency problem, the horizon problem. The horizon problem is
a distinct aspect of the agency conflict between shareholders and managers. It states that
since managers are not sure about their duration of employment with the corporation,
they may tend to make managerial decisions to maximize current or short-term
performance instead of long-term performance, which is more consistent with
shareholder value maximization. Thus, it is hypothesized that
H1:

Incentive-based
performance.

compensation

positively

impacts

long-term

REIT

If incentive-based compensation shows a positive relation to long-term
subsequent performance, this result would be consistent with the alignment of interest
hypothesis. On the other hand, a negative relation or evidence of no relation between
these two variables would question the reason REIT CEOs are paid incentive based
compensation. However, as posited by Agrawal and Knoeber (1996), a finding of no
relation between incentive-based compensation and REIT performance could be due to
the highly regulated nature of the REIT industry. Put simply, since other monitoring and
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alignment mechanisms are in place, greater use of incentive-based compensation does not
need to be positively related to REIT performance.
2.1. The Evidence for REITs
The effect of managerial compensation on performance has been examined in the
context of REITs to some extent. For example, Cannon and Vogt (1995) find a positive
relation between cash salary and annual REIT stock returns. However, Alshimmiri (2004)
finds a weak negative relation between cash compensation and firm performance as
measured by Tobin’s Q. More recently, Ghosh and Sirmans (2005) find that total and
cash compensation are positively related to contemporaneous performance as measured
by ROA and ROE. However, these studies do not focus on incentive-based
compensation. To our knowledge, there is no study that investigates the relation between
incentive-based compensation and subsequent REIT performance.
Scott, Anderson, and Loviscek’s (2001) investigate the link between performance
compensation, defined as total compensation minus cash compensation, and REIT market
performance. They find a positive relation between current performance compensation
and previous year REIT stock returns, which implies that REIT market performance is an
even more important explanatory variable of performance-based compensation than prior
research suggested. However, Scott, Anderson, and Loviscek (2001) have limited
relevance to this study for two reasons. First, their sample does not include the value of
stock options, an important component of incentive-based compensation. In fact, the
2003 SNL Financial Review reports that options constituted 21.4 percent of total
compensation in 2002, and restricted stock composed 23.1 percent of total option-
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adjusted compensation in 2002. 3 It seems troublesome to investigate performance-based
F

compensation while leaving out approximately 23.1 percent of the incentive-based
compensation. Second, they examine the effect of trailing REIT returns on the incentive
components of compensation. In contrast, this study seeks to fill the gap in the literature
by examining the relation in the opposite direction; that is, the effect of all forms of
incentive-based compensation on subsequent REIT performance
An aggregate measure for incentive-based compensation is used. It is
acknowledged that using an aggregate measure can be a limitation in the study. As noted
by Stammerjohan (2004), an aggregate incentive-based compensation measure is
imperfect since not all compensation arrangements provide the same incentives. For
example, Thatcher (2005) affirms that stock options and restricted stock provide two very
different incentives to the CEO. Restricted stock, as a full-value award, does not provide
as much leverage or as strong of an incentive for performance as do stock options or
SARs because the restricted stock continues to have value even if the stock price
decreases over the vesting period. A grantee benefits if the value increases, but they do
not suffer a complete loss if the stock price declines. Bryan and Hwang (2000) conclude
that restricted stock is relatively inefficient in inducing risk averse CEOs to accept risky,
value-increasing investment projects due to its linear payoffs. However, as noted by
Thatcher (2005), restricted stock has a stronger retention power than options or SARs.
The separate analysis of each form of incentive-based compensation constitutes material
for future research.

3

The Executive Compensation Review in the 2003 edition of SNL Real Estate Securities Weekly, available
at http://www.snl.com/real_estate/archive/20030721.asp
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CHAPTER 3
THE DETERMINANTS OF COMPENSATION

Much of the existing empirical work in CEO compensation concentrates on how
various characteristics of the firms are associated with different compensation schemes.
In general, monitoring and alignment mechanisms, as well as economic determinants,
have been found to affect the value maximizing structure of CEO compensation. Section
3.1 discusses the empirical findings and states the research hypotheses on the relation
between corporate governance mechanisms and CEO compensation. Section 3.2
discusses the empirical evidence in the relation between economic determinants and
compensation. A summary of the major empirical studies is provided in Table 3.1.

3.1. Governance Structure and Compensation Determinants
Corporate governance practices have been found to influence compensation.
Board composition, CEO ownership, and debt monitoring are common devices used to
alleviate agency problems; however, empirical findings are mixed as to what extent and
effect these monitoring and alignment mechanisms are associated with compensation
practices.

15

3.1.1. CEO Ownership
In the context of agency theory, a one-to-one relation between firm value and
CEO ownership would seem to minimize agency costs; however, as noted by Hall and
Liebman (1998), this idea overlooks two practical considerations. On one hand, it is
impossible and impractical for managers to have significant ownership in the companies
they manage because this would require an enormous amount of CEO wealth and it
would force CEOs to ignore the fundamental principle of diversification. Moreover,
excessive CEO ownership has a perverse effect on manager’s attitude towards risk. If
managers are risk averse, excessive CEO ownership distorts the original incentive since
their personal wealth would be substantially and directly tied to company performance;
thus, they will avoid risky projects in order to protect their private wealth. Stammerjohan
(2004) studies this hypothesis and finds that as CEO ownership increases, only
contemporaneous performance increases. This evidence suggests that non-diversified
CEOs may make overly conservative decisions in response to risk aversion in the attempt
to protect current personal wealth. Thus, large personal stock ownership does not provide
the automatic “alignment of interest” so widely assumed in the executive compensation
literature. Given that Hall and Liebman (1998) suggest a small percentage of CEO
ownership, absent other effective monitoring mechanisms, it will not be sufficient to
induce value-maximizing decisions; then it can be deduced that CEO ownership is an
important determinant of compensation, but only in an optimal quantity.
Unfortunately, the relation between CEO ownership and compensation is still not
clear. Mehran (1995), Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999), and Bryan and Hwang
(2000) find a negative and significant relation between CEO ownership and different
16

forms of compensation. However, Yermack (1995) and Kole (1997) do not find any
relation between CEO ownership and different forms of compensation.
To make matters more difficult, the empirical evidence for REITs is scarce and
even more confusing. Hardin (1998) finds a positive relation between cash compensation
and CEO ownership, but Ghosh and Sirmans (2005) find a negative and significant
relation between CEO ownership and total, cash, and salary compensation. Their results
are consistent with the hypothesis that as CEOs have more ownership interest in the firm,
they will favor fair executive compensation packages and will try to keep incentive
compensation at a reasonable level. This way, they will avoid excessive exposure of their
personal wealth to the risks of the firms.
Despite the mixed empirical evidence, it is expected that a CEO with an optimal
amount of ownership in his company would behave more as a shareholder and would
make managerial decisions to enhance shareholders wealth. In setting compensation
schemes, CEOs with share ownership would still agree to be paid incentive-based
compensation but at a reasonable level. Therefore, it is hypothesized that
H2: CEO ownership is inversely related to incentive based compensation.

3.1.2. Structure of the Board of Directors
The board of directors is the main internal mechanism of corporate governance in
place at any corporation. Since the board of directors monitors managers and makes
executive compensation decisions, it is typical to include board features in compensation
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models. Specifically, the most common are the size of the board, the composition of the
board, director characteristics 4 , and the influence of the CEO on the board.
The size and composition of the board may provide evidence of board
effectiveness and independency. Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999) find that less
independent boards award higher levels of compensation to their CEOs. Feng, Ghosh,
and Sirmans (2005) argue that small boards and boards with a large number of outside
directors, compared to large boards or those with many inside directors, may be more
efficient and act more independently on behalf of shareholders. In fact, they find that
REITs with small boards outperform those with large boards in terms of five year average
ROA and market to book ratio. However, they find no evidence that boards with more
outside directors lead to better financial performance. They provide as a possible
explanation that independent, small boards tend to have more outside directors but more
of these directors joined the board after the current CEO was appointed; hence, the
independence of outside directors could be compromised due to CEO involvement in
their appointments.
To the point that small boards are more efficient, agreements on the level and type
of compensation arrangements for REIT CEOs can be expected to be better than in the
case of large boards. As board size increases, it is reasonable to think that it becomes
more difficult to coordinate board actions. Therefore, it is hypothesized that

H3: There is a positive relation between board size and incentive-based
compensation.
4

Undesirable director traits are also important. For example, directors who are older than 69, who are paid
by the company in excess of his board pay, or who perform functions on different boards at the same time
might be unable to fulfill their obligations properly. Directors who are interlocked, where an officer of the
firm serves on the board of that outside director’s company, might also have a conflict of interest
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In addition, the influence of CEOs on boards is usually measured in the form of
the number of directors appointed by the CEO and whether the CEO is chairman of the
board. Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999) find that boards under the influence of
CEOs tend to award higher levels of compensation to their CEOs. In a similar vein,
Ghosh and Sirmans (2005) observe a positive relation between CEOs chairing the board
and total compensation when performance is measured by stock return.
In that matter, a CEO that chairs the board and has the power to nominate
directors is assumed to have more control on board decisions, for his own benefit, than in
the case where a CEO neither chairs the board nor nominates directors. Therefore, it is
hypothesized that

H4: There is a positive relation between the CEO chairing the board and
incentive-based compensation.

3.1.3. Debt Monitoring
In non-REIT compensation studies, leverage is typically a control variable for
agency costs of debt. Mehran (1995), Yermack (1995), and Stammerjohan (2004) find
that leverage is unrelated to compensation. In contrast, Ryan and Wiggins (2000) finds a
positive relation between debt and compensation, but Bryan and Hwang (2000) find the
opposite. In the case of REITs, Delcoure (2005) controls for the debt-equity agency
conflict and finds no relation between short- or long-term debt and any kind of
compensation. Ghosh and Sirmans (2005) include leverage in their regression analysis,
also finding it unrelated to compensation.
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Bathala, Moon, and Rao (1994) summarize that significant use of debt financing
may result in a substantial increase of bankruptcy risk and may also increase other agency
problems, such as asset substitution and underinvestment. However, Myers (1977)
suggests that debt can also be used to alleviate such agency problems. The need to pay
interest and principal periodically reduces the control that managers have over the firm’s
cash flows. In addition, it subjects managers to monitoring by debtholders or other capital
market agents, such as credit-rating companies like Standard and Poor’s or Moody’s
Investor Services. REITs provide an opportunity to test for the monitoring benefits of
debt rather than for controlling for agency cost of debt.
First, REITs invest in tangible assets which, in accordance to capital structure
theory, make them less sensitive to bankruptcy risk compared with other firms. Second,
despite the logic that REITs may rely on debt as a source of financing due to their
requirement to pay out 90 percent of their taxable income every year, REITs should
prefer equity financing over debt financing. After all, REITs do not obtain a tax shelter
for the use of debt, and if they issue debt, they must compete with other firms who enjoy
tax savings by paying a competitive interest rate. Accordingly, Ghosh, Nag, and Sirmans
(1997) report that REITs used equity more than debt to finance new projects during the
1991–1996 period. Third, Smith and Watts (1992) state that regulated firms are expected
to have higher leverage and pay out higher dividends. In consequence, to fund investment
opportunities, regulated firms will depend on capital markets and will be subject to
monitoring by capital market agents. Fourth, Highfield, Roskelley, and Zhao (2006)
study agency costs of debt for REITs, rooted in Myers (1977) theory, by examining the
maturity of REITs debt issues and the matching of their debt maturity to asset maturity.
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They find that REITs with relatively high market-to-book ratios tend to issue short-term
debt, but they find no evidence that REITs match debt maturity to asset maturity. Their
results provide at least partial empirical evidence that REITs, by shortening the maturity
of their debt issues, reduce their agency costs of debt. For all the mentioned reasons, it is
hypothesized that

H5: Debt monitoring substitutes for incentive-based compensation; thus, debt is
negatively related to incentive-based compensation.

3.1.4. Institutional Ownership
With the exception of Ryan and Wiggins (2000), who find a positive relation
between institutional shareholders and equity-based compensation, and Delcoure (2005),
who finds a negative relation between institutional shareholders and long-term
compensation, most researchers concentrate on investigating the relation between block
holders and compensation. In general, no distinction is made in compensation studies
between a block holder and an institutional shareholder. While block holders can be any
external holder of a significant portion of outstanding shares (individual investor,
corporations, or institutional investors), it is believe that institutional shareholders have
legal and ethical requirements that exceed those of single blockholders.
Bathala, Moon, and Rao (1994) observe that institutional investors often
undertake a protagonist’s role on corporate governance activities due not only to their
significant growing participation in the ownership of outstanding equity, but also to their
inability to follow an “exit policy” in their portfolio strategies. Exit policy refers to the
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deliberate unloading of a block of shares by institutional shareholders as a pressure
mechanism against the managers of the firm when the institutional shareholder disagrees
with their actions or strategies for the future.
In the case of REITs, institutional shareholders are not subject to the five or fewer
rule, are permanent block holders, and, thus are able to provide monitoring of
management, which block holders cannot. Therefore, seeking to exclusively assess the
monitoring capability of institutional shareholders in this work, it is hypothesized that

H6: Institutional holdings are negatively related to incentive-based compensation.
For the purpose of this study, and following Bathala, Moon, and Rao (1994),
institutional holdings are assumed to be exogenously determined since managers do not
have direct control on the level of institutional ownership of equity in the firm.

3.2. Economic Determinants
In addition to the corporate governance and alignment mechanisms discussed
above, economic determinants, which can have an impact on CEO compensation, include
firm characteristics such as size, investment opportunities, risk (total or idiosyncratic),
prior or current year performance, and leverage. For the case of REITs, it is argued that
their property focus can also have an impact on CEOs compensation. The following
subsections discuss a variety of economic determinants of managerial compensation as
presented in previous literature.
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3.2.1. Firm Size
Firm size can proxy for the complexity of a firm’s operations. Larger firms are
more difficult to monitor, and, therefore, firm size may positively impact the use of
incentive-based compensation. However, empirical evidence on the relation between
compensation and size is mixed. For non-REITs, Mehran (1995) finds no relation
between equity-based compensation and a firm’s size, while Ryan and Wiggins (2000),
Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999), and Stammerjohan (2004) find a positive relation
between size and a given type of compensation.
For REITs, Hardin (1998) finds a positive relation between cash compensation
and size. In addition, Scott, Anderson, and Loviscek (2001) find a positive relation
between performance compensation and firm size. However, both find size unrelated to
total compensation. Pennathur, Gilley, and Shelor (2005) find a negative relation between
size and stock option awards, but they find no relation between size and the stock option
awards mix or the ratio of stock options awarded to total the CEO’s compensation.

3.2.2. Investment Opportunities
As suggested by Ryan and Wiggins (2000), firms with high growth opportunities
get more of their value from future cash flows. Smith and Watts (1992) suggest that
manager actions are less observable if the firm has more investment opportunities. As
information asymmetries grow, it becomes more difficult for shareholders to observe
managerial behavior and growth opportunities. Thus, it is rational to find that firms with
high investment opportunities use more incentive-based compensation to reward their
CEOs. Consistent with this hypothesis, Mehran (1995), Ryan and Wiggins (2000), Core,
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Holthausen, and Larcker (1999), and Bryan and Hwang (2000) find a positive relation
between investment opportunities and different forms of CEO compensation for nonREITs. In contrast, Yermack (1995) finds no significant relation between stock option
awards and investment opportunities.
For REITs, the evidence is truly mixed. For example, Ghosh and Sirmans (2005)
find a negative relation between investment opportunities and total compensation.
Pennathur, Gilley, and Shelor (2005) find a positive relation to stock option awards, and
Delcoure (2005) finds no link between market-to-book ratio and long-term compensation
for REITs.
Typically, expenditures on research and development and the market-to-book
ratio are commonly used as proxies for investment or growth opportunities in non-REITs.
Only Delcoure (2005) employs the market-to-book ratio as proxy for growth
opportunities for REITs. In contrast, Ghosh and Sirmans (2005) and Pennathur, Gilley,
and Shelor (2005) employ the ratio of real estate investment to total assets and changes in
real estate investment as measures of growth opportunities. They do so because a marketto-book ratio for a REIT can be interpreted as the ratio between the current market value
of real estate holdings and their book value, a simple historical value appreciation
measure.

3.2.3. Firm Performance
Previous or current year performances have traditionally been tied to CEO
compensation because the board of directors commonly uses past accounting and market
performance measures as a guide in evaluating CEO performance at the time of setting
24

the CEO’s annual compensation contracts. Thus, in an agency framework, it is reasonable
to assume that incentive-based compensation should be an increasing function of firm
performance in order to serve as both an incentive and alignment mechanism to hire and
retain the best CEOs. Empirical evidence almost conclusively supports such a hypothesis.
For non-REITs, Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999) and Stammerjohan (2004)
find a positive relation between previous performance and different forms of
compensation. For REITs, Ghosh and Sirmans (2005) find that both ROA and stock
returns are positively related to total compensation in the next period. In contrast, Scott,
Anderson, and Loviscek (2001) find such a relation only for performance compensation,
but they find no such relation between total compensation and past performance. Finally,
Pennathur, Gilley, and Shelor (2005) find that option awards and the option awards mix,
are negatively related to stock returns. They explain that this may be due to the fact that
their sample period is a recessionary period for REITs and options may be awarded in
such circumstances to incentive managers to enhance REIT performance. In summary,
performance measures, in most cases, whether they are accounting or market measures,
seem to positively impact compensation.

3.2.4. Risk
As firms bear more business or total risk, their cash flows become more uncertain,
and it becomes more difficult to monitor CEOs. In addition, Bryan and Hwang (2000)
argue that under uncertainty, managers have the incentive to undertake a safer project
over a risky one due to the fact that they bear the total risk of their investment choice,
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while shareholders do not. To control both situations, firms may rely on incentive-based
compensation.
Yermack (1995) and Bryan and Hwang (2000) find a positive relation between
use of stock options or restricted stocks awards and noise in accounting earnings. Core,
Holthausen, and Larcker (1999) use two measures of firm risk and find exactly opposite
results. Using the standard deviation of ROA as a proxy for firm risk, they find a negative
relation between firm risk and total and cash compensation, but no relation to salary.
Using the standard deviation of stock returns, they find no relation between firm risk and
total and cash compensation, but a negative relation for salary. Similarly, Ryan and
Wiggins (2000) find no significant relation between equity-based compensation and noise
in accounting earnings, and Mehran (1995) finds no significant relation between business
risk and equity-based compensation.
For REITs, Pennathur, Gilley, and Shelor (2005) find a positive relation between
the standard deviation of monthly returns and both stock options awards and stock
options mix. Likewise, Delcoure (2005) finds a positive relation between funds from
operations (FFO) volatility and long-term compensation.

3.2.5. Leverage
Following the logic given in Smith and Watts (1992), if incentive-based
compensation is instituted to align the interests of managers and shareholders at the
expense of debtholders, heavily leveraged firms should decrease such compensation since
their agency costs of debt are exacerbated for firms in such circumstances. However,
Mehran (1995), Yermack (1995), and Stammerjohan (2004) find leverage is unrelated to
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compensation. In contrast, Ryan and Wiggins (2000) find a positive relation between debt
and compensation, but Bryan and Hwang (2000) find the opposite. With regard to REITs,
Ghosh and Sirmans (2005) include a proxy for leverage in their analysis and find a nonsignificant relation, and Delcoure (2005) finds no relation between short-or long-term
debt and any type of compensation.
In short, with the exception of the positive relation between prior year (or current)
performance and all forms of compensation, the empirical evidence is mixed for all the
other factors. The main reason for such heterogeneous results could be that compensation
schemes, as well as the focus of academic research, have varied across time. That is,
before equity-based compensation became popular in the early 1990s, compensation
studies concentrated on the level of compensation. 5 Currently, the structure of
compensation is dominated by equity-based incentives.

3.2.6. Property Focus
As stated by Capozza and Seguin (1999), the simplicity of the REIT industry, the
availability of detailed financial accounts, and the availability of information about
replacement costs of real properties make REITs relatively more transparent compared to
non-REITs. However, there are variations in the level of transparency within the REIT
industry. For example, in the case of hotel REITs, data in hotel occupancy and prices are
publicly available; thus, their cash flows can be estimated. In contrast, cash flow data in
multi-family and industrial space deals are not as readily available, making it more
difficult to estimate their cash flows. Thus, cash flow estimations are easier for some
5

Even though some of the studies included all forms of monetary compensation in their measures, cash compensation
was actually a predominant portion of total compensation in those studies.

27

REITs than others. The SNL Financial database classifies REITs into twelve different
foci; namely, “self-storage,” “shopping center,” “regional mall,” “retail:other,” “multyfamily,” “manufactured homes,” “office,” “industrial,” “specialty,” “diversified,” “hotel,”
and “health care.” This study groups REITs with similar focus and create binary variables
as follows: RETAIL is equal to one for REITs with focus on shopping center, regional
mall, or retail:other; zero otherwise; RESIDENTIAL is equal to one if the REIT focuses
on multy-family or manufactured homes, zero otherwise; MIXED is equal to one if the
REIT focuses on specialty or diversified; zero otherwise; and

HOTEL, OFFICE,

INDUSTRIAL, and HEALTHCARE are equal to one for REITs with focus on hotels,
offices, industries, and health care respectively.

3.3. The Interrelation between Monitoring and Alignment Mechanisms
In addition to incentive-based compensation, corporate governance relies on other
alignment and monitoring mechanisms to control managerial actions. Bathala, Moon, and
Rao (1994) suggest that the existence of other internal and external monitoring
mechanisms determine the extent to which debt, managerial ownership, and other devices
are utilized to minimize agency conflicts. Lippert and Moore (1995) study the relation
between CEO compensation and internal or external monitoring mechanisms and find
that firms with well-developed internal monitoring systems and that are open to the
market for corporate control have CEO contracts with less incentive-based compensation.
Such results imply that incentive-based compensation substitutes for other corporate
governance mechanisms Delcoure (2005) and Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999) have
also concluded that compensation substitutes for monitoring mechanisms.
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Even though the relation between board structure, firm performance, and CEO
compensation has been widely explored, for most of these studies, the reliability of the
results is questionable because they have either analyzed performance or compensation
including one monitoring mechanism at the time 6 or have included several monitoring
mechanisms but employed a deficient econometric approach. 7 Agrawal and Knoeber
(1996) find empirical evidence that research findings may be misleading when
monitoring mechanisms are examined separately because the interdependence among
them is ignored. Furthermore, Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) note that findings may also
be misleading when mechanisms are examined in a cross-sectional regression instead of
within a simultaneous equation framework.
Based on Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999), Ghosh and Sirmans (2005)
analyze the effects of board structure on cash compensation and total compensation for
REITs. Since economic theory suggests that ownership, board structure, and performance
are often endogenously determined, they perform a two-stage least squares procedure to
account for the perceived endogeneity problem. In addition, to be able to estimate their
simultaneous equation model, they treat all board of directors’ variables as exogenous
variables.
In order to examine the determinants of CEO incentive based compensation for
REITs, the two-stage least squares procedure is employed as well. Following their
methods, all board features are treated as exogenous variables.

6

See Feng, Ghosh, and Sirmans (2005) and Ghosh and Sirmans (2003) on the relation between board
structure and performance, Chan, Leung and Wang (1998) on institutional investment and performance,
and Han (2004) on insider ownership and a REITs value.
7
See Delcoure (2005) and Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999)
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Table 3.1 Overview of the major empirical studies
Study
Panel A: Non-REIT studies
Mehran (1995)

Major issue
Determinants of
executive compensation
and relation between
equity based
compensation and firm
performance
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Yermack (1995)

Why corporations
award stock options to
their CEOs

Core, Holthausen, and
Larcker (1999)

Determinants of CEO
compensation and the
relation between CEO
compensation and
performance

Ryan and Wiggins (2000)

Determinants of equity
based compensation for
CEOs and other
executives
CEO compensation and
subsequent firm
performance

Stammerjohan (2004)

Major findings
•
Negative relation between managerial ownership and equity based
compensation (EBC)
•
Negative relation between outside blockholder ownership and EBC
•
Firms with more outside directors pay more EBC
•
Performance (Tobin’s Q and ROA) is positively related to EBC and top
managers ownership
•
No relation between performance and blockholders holdings
•
Of five agency related variables, namely, alignment of hypothesis (CEO stock
ownership), horizon problem (CEO age), growth opportunities (Tobin’s Q),
monitoring difficulty (Variance of annual changes in ROE), and agency costs of debt
(financial leverage), only one has a statistically significant coefficient estimate
indicating a negative relation between noise in accounting earnings and the mix of
stock options to cash compensation.
•
Significant positive relation between total, cash, salary compensation and firm
size, investment opportunities, stock returns, and standard deviation ROA
•
CEO compensation is an increasing function of board size, CEO chairmanship
and outside directors; and a decreasing function of CEO ownership and blockholders
holdings.
•
Predicted component of compensation is negatively related to subsequent firm
operating and stock return performance
•
Positive relation between equity-based awards and investment growth
opportunities, firm size, institutional holdings, percentage of outsiders in the board,
and leverage respectively
•
•

Stock options are positively related to subsequent performance (t+1, t+3, t+5)
CEO ownership is negatively related to subsequent performance (t+3, t+5)

Table 3.1 Continued.
Study
Panel B: REIT studies
Hardin (1998)

Scott, Anderson, and
Loviscek (2001)

Pennathur, Gilley and Shelor
(2005)

Major issue
The determinants of
REIT CEO’s cash
compensation
REIT performance
as a determinant of
REIT CEOs
compensation
Determinants of
CEO stock based
compensation

Major findings
•

Positive relation between cash compensation and firm size and senior executive
stock ownership.

•

Positive relation between performance compensation and firm size and REIT stock
return
No relation between property focus and performance compensation

•
•
•
•
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Ghosh and Sirmans (2005)

The determinants of
CEO compensation

•
•
•

Delcoure (2005)

The determinants of
REITs’ senior
executive
compensation

•
•

REIT CEOs are rewarded for increasing Real Estate Investment and funds from
operations
Positive relation between option awards and variability in stock returns (proxy for
noise or riskiness in projects)
Negative relation between option awards (or option award mix, the ratio of option
awards to cash compensation) and REIT stock return and REIT size
Larger boards, with a higher percentage of outside directors award higher total
compensation
Positive relation between total compensation and previous year performance and
CEO chairmanship
Negative relation between total compensation and CEO ownership and blockholder
ownership respectively
REITs where CEO chairs the board and with volatility in their earnings award
more long term compensation
Negative relation between long-term compensation and institutional holdings

CHAPTER 4
DATA AND METHODS

This chapter describes the data set and lays out the methods employed on this
research. Section 4.1 describes the data, sample selection, and sample characteristics.
Section 4.2 discusses the methodology. Section 4.2.1 develops the statistical models used
to examine the relation between incentive-based compensation and subsequent REIT
performance. Section 4.2.2 presents the statistical models used to estimate the
determinants of REIT CEOs incentive-based compensation.

4.1. Data
The sample is initially identified from a list of exchange-traded, equity, hybrid,
and operating REITs reported in the SNL Financial REIT Database (SNL). The financial
variables of interest, CEO cash compensation, CEO incentive-based compensation,
institutional holdings, and CEO ownership data are collected from the SNL Financial
REIT Database. Stock returns are collected from the Center for Research in Security
Prices (CRSP) file. Board of directors characteristics are obtained from proxy statements.
A sample of 185 REITs from SNL that existed in 1998 was obtained. From these
observations, 152 are equity REITs, 11 are hybrid REITs, and 22 are Real Estate
Operating Companies (REOCs). All REITs must be publicly traded on the NYSE,
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AMEX, or NASDAQ. As shown in Table 4.1, SNL reports information on real estate
companies with SIC codes ranging from 6500 to 7011. As denoted by the Securities and
Exchange Commission, a REIT must be reported as SIC code 6798; thus, the
observations with SIC codes other than 6798 were dropped. In cases where the SIC codes
are unobservable in SNL, the SIC code reported in the company’s proxy statement is
used. This screen reduces the sample to 159 observations with an SIC code of 6798.
Then the sample was screened for missing data. Twenty-eight observations did
not have total value of assets as of the end of 1998; thus, the remaining 131 observations
contain equity, hybrid, or operating REITs. Turning to the proxies, board data for 18 of
the firms is not obtainable; thus, the sample is reduced to 113 firms. The same procedure
is repeated for the years of 1999 to 2003. The final sample is an unbalanced panel data
with 390 observations. Table 4.2 provides the descriptive statistics for the full sample and
by year.
As shown in Panel A of Table 4.2, over the five-year period, the average REIT
CEO received around 45 percent of his compensation in the form of incentive based
compensation. Again, CEO incentive-based compensation is the sum of stock options,
restricted stocks, and performance plans as reported by SNL. In addition, REIT CEOs
held approximately 6.69 percent of the REIT total outstanding shares. As far as
performance is concerned, the average REIT experienced annual stock returns of 9.05
percent and the average return on assets was 3.52 percent. As far as board of directors’
characteristics, the average REIT had a board of around eight members, and almost 63
percent of all boards were led by the CEO serving as chairman of the board.
Approximately 67.7 percent of board members were outside directors. Compared to non33

REIT boards, which have an average size of 12.25 members (Yermack, 1996), REIT
boards are smaller, but their independence, as represented by the presence of outside
directors, is compromised by the high percentage of boards chaired by their CEOs.
Finally, the average REIT had an average market capitalization of almost 1.2 billion, a
net property investment of almost eighteen times the amount of REIT funds from
operations (FFO), long-term debt that represented around 37 percent of their total
capitalization, and average institutional holdings, as indicated by the percentage of shares
outstanding held by institutional investors, of 46.9 percent.
In panel B of Table 4.2, it is presented the descriptive statistics per year. The table
indicates that incentive-based compensation has increased from 42.6 percent of the total
compensation in 1999 to almost 46.7 percent in 2003, which represents an increase of
around ten percent over this 5-year period. Figure 4.3 shows the incentive-based
compensation trends, by component, for the whole period. One can observe that the
growth in incentive-based compensation stems mainly from the award of restricted
stocks, as awards of stock options have declined since the year 2000. In addition, it can
be noticed that performance and other long-term compensation plans have represented
around four percent of incentive-based compensation in the whole period. REIT
profitability, as proxied by return on assets, has declined steadily from around four
percent in 1999 to 2.81 percent in 2003. In contrast, the average REIT stock return has
fluctuated widely during the same period. REIT average stock returns were -9.81 and
-3.87 percent during the years of 1999 and 2000, respectively. However, during the years
of 2001 and 2002, REIT stocks returned 24.08 and 23.66 percent, respectively. In 2003,
the average REIT stock return was around 9.44 percent. Average institutional holdings
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have increased by almost twenty percent, from 46.2 percent in 1999 to 55.16 percent in
2003. The long-term debt-to-equity ratio indicates that leverage has been quite constant
since the year 2000. The average CEO stock ownership has averaged 6.22 to seven
percent during the sample period. Finally, board size has increased slightly from 7.87
percent in 1999 to 8.09 percent in 2003, and the presence of outsiders has increased from
65.9 percent in 1999 to 68.6 percent in 2003. However, by 2003, more than 66 percent of
REIT boards were led by the CEO, whereas around 61 percent did so in 1999.
Table 4.4 presents the Pearson correlation coefficients for all variables in the
sample. While some variables are statistically correlated, the degree of correlation
between variables does not appear to indicate the presence of multicollinearity. 8 The
correlation matrix shows, as expected, highly significant correlations between incentivebased compensation and market capitalization. While correlation does not indicate
causation, in most cases where two variables are highly correlated, the coefficient
estimate will be statistically significant in a regression analysis due to the fact that OLS is
based on linearity and correlation is a linear measure.

4.2. Methods
The following sections develop a framework for testing the hypotheses stated in
section 3. Section 4.2.1 describes the estimation approach to assess the relation between

8

There is a high correlation between market capitalization and institutional holdings. I ran the OLS
equations excluding one variable at the time and the results do not change significantly. In addition to
Pearson correlation coefficients, I ran condition numbers and we find collinearity presence in the case of
market capitalization and board size. Such findings indicate little variation of these variables in the sample,
which is expected, and, thus, do not represent any problem.
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CEO compensation and REIT performance. Section 4.2.2 details the method for
examining the determinants of incentive-based compensation.

4.2.1. Compensation and REIT Performance
Unlike previous studies, this dissertation analyzes the effect of incentive-based
compensation on REIT performance. In accordance to the alignment hypothesis, it seems
reasonable to assume that incentive-based compensation would encourage CEOs to
increase REIT performance.
In order to determine how incentive-based compensation is associated with REIT
performance, the following empirical models are proposed:
RETURN = α + β1COMP + β 2 REINVEST + β 3 MKTCAP + ε i ,

(1)

ROA = α + β1 IBCOMP + β 2 REINVEST + β3 MKTCAP + ε i ,

(2)

and

where RETURN and ROA are one-year and three-year cumulative stock returns using
daily data and the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes (before extraordinary items)
to total capitalization, respectively. IBCOMP is the natural log of incentive-based
compensation. 9 The last two variables are control variables representing the ratio of net
property investment to FFO (REINVEST) and the natural logarithm of total capitalization
of the firm (MKTCAP). 10 It is expected that firms with higher growth opportunities will
experience better performance than firms with low growth opportunities. In addition, the
9

We also use the ratio of total incentive based compensation to total compensation in these models as a
robustness check. The results are similar. Please refer to tables 5.1 and 5.2 for details.
10
MKTCAP is total market capitalization. That is, the market capitalization of common equity, assuming
the conversion of all operating partnership units into common stock plus total debt plus preferred equity
plus redeemable preferred plus trust preferred plus preferred minority Interest in operating partnership
units. Debt is shown at book value. All preferred interests are calculated at liquidation value.
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size of the firm may have a relation with performance. For example, Alshimmiri (2004)
finds that large REITs experience lower performance compared to small REITs, as
measured by Tobin’s Q. Therefore, a negative relation between firm size and REIT
performance is expected. Control variables are measured as of the prior year to the
performance. For example, it is tested whether incentive-based compensation awarded in
2000 affects 2001 and 2003 REIT stock returns. In such scenarios, MKTCAP and
REINVEST are measured as of 2000 and 2002, respectively.
Following Stammerjohan (2004) the above models are based on the following
sequence of events: (1) prior to t-l, the CEO and firm set a compensation contract for
services performed during the year beginning at t-l and ending at t; (2) the CEO makes
decisions affecting current and future firm performance during the year; (3)
compensation resulting from the contract is observable at t; (4) and, contemporaneous
firm performance is observable at t and subsequent firm performance is observable over
subsequent periods at times t+k, for k is equal to one and three.
The sample is grouped in a panel data set. Time-series cross-sectional data has
several advantages (Baltagi, 1998). First, it allows a more efficient estimation of the
parameters due to the richer source of variation. Second, panel data sets are better to
identify and estimate effects that are simply not detectable in pure cross-section or pure
time-series data. Third, panel data sets a control for individual heterogeneity. Such
heterogeneity is often the central focus of the analysis (Greene (2003) and requires
important econometric considerations. As in the typical panel dataset, our sample consists
of a large number of cross-sectional units (REITs) and only few periods (years). The first
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hypothesis is tested by using both balanced and unbalanced panel data sets. Results are
shown in Tables 5.1 and 5.2.
Models (1) and (2) follow the basic regression model of the form:
y it = α + X it β + μ it .
However, under the error components specification, the residual terms take the
form:

μ it = z i + v it ,
Where z i is a time invariant, cross-section specific component (the heterogeneity or
individual effect) and vit are remainder effects.
Under the least square dummy variable (LSDV) specification, zi ’s are thought as
fixed parameters to be estimated and included as a part of the intercept:
yit = (α + zi Di ) + X it′ β + vit and vit : ( 0, σ v 2 ) ,
Where Di is a dummy variable for the i-th REIT
Under a random effects model specification, the dummy variable is part of the
error:
yit = α + X it′ β + ( zi Di + vit ) and zit : ( 0, σ z 2 ) .
The first step is to decide between performing pooled OLS or panel data
techniques. For this purpose, the Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test is employed. The null
hypothesis is that the variance of zi is equal to zero. If the null hypothesis is rejected,
then a panel data approach should be employed.
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Moreover, a decision is needed about using either one or two-way fixed and
random effect models. One-way models are appropriate when variations depend only on
either group effects (REITs) or time effects (years), while two-way models are
appropriate when variations depend on both. Greene (2003) points out that “time effects
are often viewed as transitions or discrete changes of state. They are typically modeled as
specific to the period in which they occur and are not carried across periods within a
cross-sectional unit.” Therefore, it is assumed that REIT characteristics are constant
across time; that is, the variations stem mainly from the cross sectional units or different
REITs, and, therefore, results for one-way fixed or random effect models are provided.
Finally, a decision is needed about using the random effect model or the fixed
effect model, its competing specification. A random effect model is appropriate when a
random sample is drawn from a population. Since in this case observations are
representative of the whole REIT population, the fixed effect approach is the most
appropriate specification. 11

4.2.2. The Determinants of the level of incentive-based compensation paid to REIT
CEOs
Ghosh and Sirmans (2005), Ryan and Wiggins (2000), Core, Holthausen, and
Larcker (1999), and Bathala, Moon, and Rao (1994) clearly identify interrelations among
CEO compensation, CEO ownership, and firm performance. Thus, if the interrelations

11

Alternatively, the Hausman specification test for random effects can be employed to decide between the
fixed effects and random effects models. The Hausman’s test states that under the null hypothesis, zi is
uncorrelated with the independent variables. If the unobserved heterogeneity can be assumed to be
uncorrelated with the included variables, then a random approach is appropriate; otherwise, a fixed effects
specification may be better.
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between variables when examining the determinants of incentive-based compensation for
REITs were ignored, the models will render biased estimates. This situation occurs
because an important assumption of the classical ordinary-least squares (OLS) model is
that the error term is uncorrelated with the independent variables. In the presence of
endogeneity, this OLS assumption is violated; therefore, one needs to employ the twostage-least squares (2SLS) methodology. Thus, following Ghosh and Sirmans (2005), a
2SLS procedure is employed.
Two systems of simultaneous equations are used to account for stock returns and
ROA as the performance variable, respectively. The equations are very similar to the
ones employed by Ghosh and Sirmans (2005) but with the dependent variable being
incentive based compensation instead of total compensation:

IBCOMP = α + β1 RETURN + β 2CEOOWN + β 3 REINVEST + β 4 BSIZE
+ β 5OUTSIDERS + β 6CEOCHAIR + β 7 INST +
+ β jYEAR j + β k FOCUS k
RETURN = α + β1 IBCOMP + β 2CEOOWN + β 3 MKTCAP + β 4 REINVEST
+ β 5 LTDE + β 6OUTSIDERS + β 7CEOCHAIR
+ β jYEAR j + β k FOCUSk
CEOOWN = α + β1 RETURN + β 2 IBCOMP + β 3 LTDE + β 4 BSIZE
+ β5OUTSIDERS + β 6CEOCHAIR + β 7 INST + ε ,

and
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(4)

IBCOMP = α + β1 ROA + β 2CEOOWN + β 3 REINVEST + β 4 BSIZE
+ β5OUTSIDERS + β 6CEOCHAIR + β 7 INST +
+ β jYEAR j + β k FOCUS k
ROA = α + β1 IBCOMP + β 2CEOOWN + β 3 MKTCAP + β 4 REINVEST
+ β 5 LTDE + β 6OUTSIDERS + β 7CEOCHAIR

(5)

+ β jYEAR j + β k FOCUS k
CEOOWN = α + β1 ROA + β 2 IBCOMP + β 3 LTDE + β 4 BSIZE
+ β5OUTSIDERS + β 6CEOCHAIR + β 7 INST + ε ,

where the endogenous variables are the natural log of total compensation that is
incentive-based (IBCOMP), REIT performance (ROA or RETURN), and CEO ownership
(CEOOWN). Incentive-based compensation refers to pay for long-term performance, not
to the method of payment. That is, incentive-based compensation includes long-term
incentives, such as equity-based incentives (stock options and restricted stocks) as well as
long-term performance plans that can be paid in cash, equity, or both cash and equity.
This is an important difference with respect to other studies that concentrate on the role
of stock options and restricted stocks in providing incentives to increase the stock price
while completely ignoring other incentives. 12 In that regard, this study differs from Scott,
Anderson, and Loviscek (2001) because it includes the estimated value of options granted
in a given year. Thus, IBCOMP is the natural log of the sum of restricted stock, long-term
incentive plans, and estimated value of options awarded divided by the CEO’s total
compensation.

12

See Yermack (1995), Hall, and Liebman (1998), Bryan and Hwang (2000), and Core, Guay, and Larcker
(2003)
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Following Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999), stock options are valued at 25%
of their exercise price. The grants of restricted stocks and the value of long term
performance plans are taken as reported by the SNL Financial Database. As Core,
Holthausen, and Larcker (1999) do, it is acknowledged that the valuation of long term
compensation is complicated and that, in reality, the amount of compensation that will
ultimately be received from any form of long-term compensation plan is uncertain.
REIT performance is measured using either stock return in system (4) or return
on assets in system (5). RETURN is the cumulative stock market return for the year prior
to the year in which compensation is awarded. ROA is the ratio of earnings before interest
and taxes (before extraordinary items) are divided by total capitalization for the year prior
to the year in which compensation is awarded.
The exogenous variables in systems (4) and (5) are MKTCAP, REINVEST, the
standard deviation of daily stock returns over the past year (SDRETURN), the standard
deviation of ROA over the past three years (SDROA), the number of directors in the
board (BSIZE), the number of outside directors (OUTSIDERS), a binary variable equal to
one for CEOs serving as chairman of the board, zero otherwise (CEOCHAIR), 13 the ratio
of long-term debt to total capitalization (LTDE), the percentage of outstanding shares
owned by institutional shareholders (INST), and the binary variables for REIT property
focus. The property type variables are included as control variables for variations in the
level of transparency in corporate governance for REITs to be consistent with Scott,
Anderson, and Loviscek’s work (2001). Self-storage REITs are used as the reference

13

These board of director variables are chosen since they are consistently found significant by Ghosh and
Sirmans (2005) and Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999)
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focus because in a rough ranking from least to most transparent REITs,14 using as criteria
the availability of cash flows and other financial data, self-storage REITs are considered
to have an average ranking on transparency.
The SNL Financial database classifies REITs as “self-storage,” “shopping
center,” “regional mall,” “retail:other,” “multy-family,” “manufactured homes,” “office,”
“industrial,” “specialty,” “diversified,” “hotel,” and “health care.” In contrast, this study
created binary variables as follows: RETAIL is equal to one for REITs with focus on
shopping center, regional mall, or retail:other; zero otherwise; RESIDENTIAL is equal to
one if the REIT focuses on multy-family or manufactured homes, zero otherwise;
MIXED is equal to one if the REIT focuses on specialty or diversified; zero otherwise;
and HOTEL, OFFICE, INDUSTRIAL, and HEALTHCARE are equal to one for REITs
with focus on hotels, offices, industries, and health care, respectively.

14

From the least to the most transparent REITs: multi-family, industrial, retail, self-storage, health care,
office, and hotel REITs.
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Table 4.1. Real Estate Related Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Codes
SIC Code

Description

6500

Real Estate

6510

Real Estate Operators (No Developers) & Lessors

6512

Operators of Nonresidential Buildings

6513

Operators of Apartment Buildings

6519

Lessors of Real Property, NEC

6531

Real Estate Agents & Managers (For Others)

6532

Real Estate Dealers (For Their Own Account)

6552

Land Subdividers & Developers (No Cemeteries)

6770

Blank Checks

6792

Oil Royalty Traders

6794

Patent Owners & Lessors

6795

Mineral Royalty Traders

6798

Real Estate Investment Trusts

6799

Investors, NEC

7000

Hotels, Rooming Houses, Camps & Other Lodging Places

7011

Hotels & Motels

This table provides the description for real estate related standard industrial classification (SIC) codes 6500
through 7011 as outlined by the United States Department of Labor and the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Source: SIC code list available at http://www.sec.gov/info/edgar/siccodes.htm.
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Table 4.2 Descriptive statistics for the full sample.
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for the full Sample
Variable
IBCOMP(%)
MKTCAP
ROA(%)
SDROA
RETURN(%)
SDRETURN
REINVEST
BSIZE
OUTSIDERS(%)
CEOCHAIR (%)
CEOOWN (%)
INST (%)
LTDE (%)

N
390
390
390
390
390
390
390
390
390
390
390
390
390

Mean
45.177
21.115
3.518
1.153
9.046
0.077
14.190
7.944
67.700
62.820
6.688
46.900
36.639

Median
47.606
21.223
3.328
0.837
8.349
0.014
13.493
8.000
66.667
100.000
3.064
46.673
39.116

Standard
Deviation
26.850
1.085
2.155
1.183
23.657
1.226
18.960
2.037
11.917
48.390
9.912
25.413
16.571

Minimum
0.025
17.728
-5.051
0.023
-66.237
0.008
-183.162
4.000
30.000
0.000
0.079
0.000
0.000

Maximum
100.000
24.020
13.164
11.311
95.627
24.233
292.629
15.000
93.333
.100.000
72.584
100.00
83.207

Panel A shows descriptive statistics for the full sample during the period of 1999-2003 and panel B shows
descriptive statistics by year. Compensation is at time t, all other variables are at time t-1. IBCOMP% is the
ratio of total incentive based compensation to total compensation, MKTCAP is the natural logarithm of
total capitalization, ROA is the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes (before extraordinary items) to
average assets, and SDROA is the standard deviation of ROA over the last three years. RETURN is the 1year cumulative stock return, using daily stock return data, and SDRETURN is the standard deviation of
one-year daily stock returns. REINVEST is the ratio of Net Property Investment to Funds from Operations.
BSIZE is the number of directors in the board, OUTSIDERS is the ratio of outside directors to the total
number of directors in the board; CEOCHAIR is an indicator variable that equals one if the CEO leads the
board of directors, zero otherwise, and CEOOWN is the CEO’s share ownership as a percentage of the total
outstanding shares. Finally, INST is the percentage of outstanding shares owned by institutional investors,
and LTDE is the ratio of long-term debt to total capitalization.

45

Table 4.2. Continued.

Panel B: Descriptive statistics by year
Variable

N

Mean

IBCOMP(%)
MKTCAP
ROA(%)
SDROA
RETURN(%)
SDRETURN
REINVEST
BSIZE
OUTSIDERS(%)
CEOCHAIR (%)
CEOOWN (%)
INST (%)
LTDE (%)

69
69
69
69
69
69
69
69
69
69
69
69
69

42.553
21.052
4.071
1.726
-9.807
0.368
19.384
7.870
65.905
60.870
6.226
46.200
32.274

IBCOMP(%)
MKTCAP
ROA(%)
SDROA
RETURN(%)
SDRETURN
REINVEST
BSIZE
OUTSIDERS(%)
CEOCHAIR (%)
CEOOWN (%)
INST (%)
LTDE (%)

83
83
83
83
83
83
83
83
83
83
83
83
83

46.020
20.875
4.159
1.101
-3.872
0.015
13.487
7.807
67.232
59.036
6.715
43.349
36.778

IBCOMP(%)
MKTCAP
ROA(%)
SDROA
RETURN(%)
SDRETURN
REINVEST
BSIZE
OUTSIDERS(%)
CEOCHAIR (%)
CEOOWN (%)
INST (%)
LTDE (%)

79
79
79
79
79
79
79
79
79
79
79
79
79

45.892
21.080
3.528
0.983
24.079
0.016
13.432
7.949
68.236
65.823
7.007
43.165
37.922

Median

Standard
Deviation
Year 1999
45.117
27.197
21.166
1.149
3.971
2.115
1.191
1.652
-7.909
14.474
0.015
2.915
14.463
33.899
7.000
1.999
66.667
11.801
100.000
49.162
2.992
8.709
48.166
23.257
35.899
17.048
Year 2000
47.109
25.005
20.955
1.092
3.977
2.226
0.840
0.952
-3.118
14.585
0.015
0.003
13.426
3.577
7.000
1.991
66.667
11.604
100.000
49.476
3.028
10.802
41.170
24.732
39.148
15.810
Year 2001
50.063
27.030
21.203
1.105
3.314
2.056
0.654
1.109
23.547
22.863
0.014
0.006
12.837
5.159
8.000
1.999
70.000
12.455
100.000
47.733
3.020
11.198
41.131
26.887
39.700
17.769
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Minimum

Maximum

0.033
17.728
-2.567
0.152
-58.739
0.009
3.325
4.000
30.000
0.000
0.117
0.003
0.000

100.00
23.471
9.147
11.311
18.898
24.233
292.629
13.000
90.000
100.000
42.978
80.745
63.858

0.198
17.974
0.117
0.034
-52.922
0.009
4.507
4.000
40.000
0.000
0.079
0.088
0.000

100.00
23.449
13.164
5.072
27.638
0.025
25.771
15.000
90.909
100.000
70.575
89.473
70.242

0.029
18.246
-5.051
0.084
-66.237
0.008
-14.619
4.000
37.500
0.000
0.160
0.000
0.000

100.00
23.758
10.491
6.650
90.181
0.050
29.429
13.000
92.308
100.000
72.584
93.018
70.502

Table 4.2. Panel B. Continued.
Variable

N

Mean

IBCOMP(%)
MKTCAP
ROA(%)
SDROA
RETURN(%)
SDRETURN
REINVEST
BSIZE
OUTSIDERS(%)
CEOCHAIR (%)
CEOOWN (%)
INST (%)
LTDE (%)

79
79
79
79
79
79
79
79
79
79
79
79
79

44.273
21.261
3.067
0.928
23.656
0.014
12.299
8.000
68.354
62.025
6.746
46.610
37.456

IBCOMP(%)
MKTCAP
ROA(%)
SDROA
RETURN(%)
SDRETURN
REINVEST
BSIZE
OUTSIDERS(%)
CEOCHAIR (%)
CEOOWN (%)
INST (%)
LTDE(%)

80
80
80
80
80
80
80
80
80
80
80
80
80

46.751
21.306
2.811
1.101
9.439
0.015
13.056
8.087
68.558
66.250
6.686
55.164
38.185

Median

Standard
Deviation
Year 2002
46.823
27.753
21.276
1.060
2.815
2.169
0.689
0.868
18.968
24.579
0.012
0.006
13.304
23.078
8.000
2.172
66.667
12.454
100.000
48.842
3.386
9.044
45.926
25.152
41.235
17.018
Year 2003
53.005
27.781
21.360
0.994
2.824
1.912
0.766
1.130
11.627
17.795
0.013
0.005
13.873
13.644
8.000
2.057
66.667
11.353
100.000
47.584
3.444
9.617
55.233
25.385
40.848
14.946
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Minimum

Maximum

0.025
18.785
-4.433
0.023
-23.401
0.008
-183.162
4.000
40.000
0.000
0.257
2.735
0.000

100.00
24.020
7.806
3.899
95.627
0.034
35.891
15.000
93.333
100.000
55.192
97.719
70.367

0.222
18.980
-2.834
0.077
-53.397
0.010
-68.210
4.000
40.000
0.000
0.264
3.373
0.000

99.063
23.668
7.013
7.714
62.913
0.039
43.935
14.000
90.909
100.000
62.425
100.000
83.207

40

Restricted Stock

30

Stock Options
20

Performance Plans
Other Long-term
Compensation plans

10

0
1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

Figure 4.3 Incentive-based compensation trend
This table shows the time trend of each component of incentive-based compensation. Restricted stocks are
valued at 25 percent of their granted value; all other forms of incentive-based compensation are valued at
their granted value as reported by the SNL financial database. Each measure is presented as a percentage of
total compensation.
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Table 4.4. Pearson Correlation Coefficients
Variables
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1.IBCOMP
2.MKTCAP
3.RETURN
4.SDRETURN
5 ROA
6 SDROA
7.REINVEST
8.BSIZE
9.OUTSIDERS
10.CEOCHAIR
11.CEOOWN
12.INST
13.LTDE

1
1.000
0.379
0.081
-0.047
0.128
-0.111
-0.080
0.020
0.174
0.129
-0.203
0.368
-0.105

2
1.000
0.088
-0.039
0.068
-0.221
-0.156
0.425
0.093
0.029
-0.279
0.707
-0.207

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

1.000
-0.058
0.117
-0.263
-0.101
0.028
0.049
-0.002
0.004
0.038
-0.093

1.000
-0.076
0.056
0.035
-0.091
-0.053
0.003
0.055
-0.108
0.003

1.000
0.007
-0.142
-0.000
-0.033
-0.014
-0.158
0.036
-0.381

1.000
-0.006
-0.102
0.031
-0.055
-0.003
-0.135
0.025

1.000
-0.058
0.005
0.027
0.106
-0.112
0.046

1.000
0.059
-0.120
-0.188
0.215
0.015

1.000
-0.029
-0.080
0.109
0.099

1.000
0.144
- 0.048
-0.146

11

12

1.000
-0.298 1.000
0.066 -0.052

13

1.000

This table provides Pearson correlation coefficients between incentive based compensation and economic, board structure, and monitoring variables.
IBCOMP is the ratio of total incentive based compensation to total compensation; MKTCAP is the natural logarithm of total capitalization; ROA is the ratio
of earnings before interest and taxes (before extraordinary items) to average assets, and SDROA is the standard deviation of ROA over the last three years.
RETURN is the 1-year cumulative stock return, using daily stock return data, and SDRETURN is the standard deviation of one-year daily stock returns.
REINVEST is the ratio of Net Property Investment to Funds from Operations. BSIZE is the number of directors in the board; OUTSIDERS is the ratio of
outside directors to the total number of directors in the board; CEOCHAIR is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the CEO leads the board of directors, zero
otherwise, and CEOOWN is the CEO’s share ownership as a percentage of the total outstanding shares. Finally, INST is the percentage of outstanding shares
owned by institutional investors, and LTDE is the ratio of total long-term debt to total assets. Correlation coefficients that are significant at the 5 percent level
are in italics.

CHAPTER 5
RESULTS ON PERFORMANCE

This chapter provides and discusses the results for the relation between incentivebased compensation and subsequent REIT performance. Results for both unbalanced and
balanced panel data are included.
As described in section 4.2.1., Lagrange Multiplier tests were performed to decide
between pooled OLS or panel data techniques. For the balanced panel data, based on the
least square residuals, a Lagrange Multiplier test statistic of 4.85 is obtained. This value
exceeds the 95 percent critical value (3.84) as given by the chi-square distribution, with
one degree of freedom. Since the test statistic is greater than the critical value, the
hypothesis that the variance of zi is equal to zero can be rejected, and it can be concluded
that individual effects do exist. As such, the classical regression model is inappropriate.
Similarly, for unbalanced panel data the, Lagrange multiplier test statistic is 12.60 and the
critical value, again, equals 3.84; thus, the hypothesis that the variance of zi is again
rejected, and it can be concluded that individual effects do indeed exist.
Next, it was modeled the ROA and RETURN equations using a one-way fixed
effects approach. Tables 5.1 and 5.2 show the results of performance models for
unbalanced and balanced panel data, respectively. Compensation is measured either as
the ratio of incentive-based compensation to total compensation (Model 1) or as the
natural log of the dollar amount of incentive-based compensation (Model 2).
Hypothesis 1 examines whether paying incentive-based compensation at time t
improves long term REIT subsequent performance. Specifically, it was tested the effect
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of incentive-based compensation awarded at time t-1, and observed at time t on REIT
performance at times t+1 and t+3. It is expected to see no relation between incentivebased compensation and performance at time t+1, but a positive relation between
incentive-based compensation and performance at time t+3 would be consistent with the
alignment of interest hypothesis. It is assumed that incentive-based compensation is
intended to improve long run rather than short run REIT performance.
Table 5.1, for an unbalanced panel data, shows the effects of incentive-based
compensation on REIT performance. The results find no relation between incentivebased compensation and ROA for either one-year or three-year subsequent REIT
performance. In addition, and contrary to expectations, it is found a strong negative
relation between incentive-based compensation and subsequent one-year and three-year
REIT stock returns. Overall, the findings in the relation between incentive-based
compensation and three year subsequent performance, as measured by ROA, and
between incentive-based compensation and subsequent performance, as measured by
REIT stock returns, are inconsistent with the alignment of interest hypothesis for the case
of REITs.
As shown in Table 5.2, results on the relation between incentive-based
compensation and REIT performance are similar for the case of a balanced panel data.
Again, it is found a strong negative relation between incentive-based compensation and
subsequent one-year and three-year REIT stock returns. In addition, it is found no
relation between incentive-based compensation and ROA for either one-year or threeyear subsequent REIT performance.

51

Overall, the results are inconsistent with the alignment of interest hypothesis and
the findings of Ryan and Wiggins (2000), Scott, Anderson, and Loviscek (2001); and
Mehran (1995). However, our findings are consistent with Pennathur, Gilley, and Shelor
(2005) who find a negative relation between one-year change in stock return and stock
option awards. They attribute such results to the market conditions at the time covered in
their sample. However, it was controlled for time effects and the research findings were
similar. Such results imply that paying incentive based compensation negatively affects
REIT performance, especially in the short-term. In accordance to agency theory, there
should not be any relation between long-term incentives and short-term performance.
The results on the relation between incentive-based compensation and long-term
subsequent performance are especially intriguing. The hypothesis states a positive
relation between incentive-based compensation and long-term subsequent performance.
Therefore, the findings of no relation between incentive-based compensation and long
term REIT return on assets are at odds with the agency literature theory. It is possible that
incentive-based compensation is not found to affect REIT performance given the highly
regulated nature of REITs and the existence of alternative control and monitoring
mechanisms that substitute for incentive-based compensation paid to REIT CEOs.
However, the negative relation between incentive-based compensation and longterm stock returns is harder to explain. Theoretically, incentive-based compensation is the
form of remuneration that gives REIT CEOs the incentive to maximize their firm value,
but our results represent evidence against such a hypothesis. Then, why is incentivebased compensation being paid at high levels to CEOs even though REITs experience
poor performance? The answer could be in the nature of the managerial labor market for
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REIT CEOs. REIT management requires a set of specialized skills that may be scarce in
the market. Hence, to attract and retain the best CEOs, competitive compensation needs
to be awarded. This process may distort the original purpose that incentive-based
compensation has from an agency perspective, which is to motivate managers to pursue
shareholders’ interests instead of their own and result in non-maximizing compensation
practices. Thus, agency-theory explanations for incentive-based compensation may not
apply due to labor market competition.
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Table 5.1 Results on Performance: Unbalanced panel data
PANEL A: Dependent variable: One-year subsequent performance
Model 1
Model 2
ROA
RETURN
ROA
RETURN
IBCOMP

0.664
(1.40)

-14.341**
(-2.04)

LOGIBCOMP
MKTCAP
REINVEST
R-Square
Observations

-0.415
(-1.09)
0.005
(0.82)
0.641
436

-8.885
(-1.86)
0.040
(0.57)
0.230
436

0.083
(1.18)
-0.441
(-1.15)
0.004
(0.80)
0.641
436

-2.848***
(-2.61)
-7.662
(-1.61)
0.036
(0.51)
0.240
436

PANEL B: Dependent variable: Three-year subsequent performance
Model 1
Model 2
ROA
RETURN
ROA
RETURN
IBCOMP

-0.125
(-0.40)

-25.189**
(-1.99)

LOGIBCOMP
MKTCAP
REINVEST
R-Square
Observations

-0.372
(-1.48)
0.003*
(1.73)
0.865
329

22.065**
(2.14)
0.262***
(3.28)
0.628
329

-0.005
(-0.12)
-0.370
(-1.47)
0.003*
(1.74)
0.865
329

-3.817**
(-2.04)
22.466**
(2.18)
0.258***
(3.22)
0.628
329

This table presents one-way fixed effects estimates for the models considered. The dependent variables are
RETURN, the cumulative subsequent stock return, and ROA, the ratio of net income (before extraordinary
items) to average assets as of the next period. IBCOMP is the ratio of incentive-based compensation to total
compensation (Model 1), and LOGIBCOMP is the natural log of the dollar amount of incentive based
compensation (Model 2). MKTCAP is the natural logarithm of total capitalization, and REINVEST is the
ratio of Net Property Investment to Funds from Operations. Statistical significance is displayed by the use
of one (10%), two (5%), or three (1%) stars.
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Table 5.2 Results on Performance: Balanced panel data
PANEL A: Dependent variable: One-year subsequent performance
Model 1
Model 2
ROA
RETURN
ROA
RETURN
IBCOMP

0.780
(1.40)

-18.374***
(-2.68)

LOGIBCOMP
MKTCAP
REINVEST
R-Square
Observations

-0.703
(-1.48)
0.003
(0.37)
0.640
325

-8.350
(-1.43)
0.121
(1.34)
0.160
325

0.086
(1.10)
-0.713*
(-1.49)
0.003
(0.38)
0.639
325

-2.815***
(-2.95)
-7.660
(-1.31)
0.112
(1.23)
0.165
325

PANEL B: Dependent variable: Three-year subsequent performance
Model 1
Model 2
ROA
RETURN
ROA
RETURN
IBCOMP

-0.164
(-0.48)

-32.289***
(-2.58)

LOGIBCOMP
MKTCAP
REINVEST
R-Square
Observations

-0.318
(-1.12)
0.010***
(3.91)
0.868
259

35.632***
(3.40)
0.328***
(3.44)
0.650
259

-0.010
(-0.21)
-0.313
(-1.10)
0.010***
(3.93)
0.868
259

-3.564**
(-2.00)
36.303***
(3.44)
0.333***
(3.47)
0.645
259

This table presents one-way fixed effects estimates for the models considered. The dependent variables are
RETURN, the cumulative subsequent stock return, and ROA, the ratio of net income (before extraordinary
items) to average assets as of the next period. IBCOMP is the ratio of incentive-based compensation to total
compensation (Model 1), and LOGIBCOMP is the natural log of the dollar amount of incentive based
compensation (Model 2). MKTCAP is the natural logarithm of total capitalization and REINVEST is the
ratio of Net Property Investment to Funds from Operations. Statistical significance is displayed by the use
of one (10%), two (5%), or three (1%) stars.
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CHAPTER 6
RESULTS ON THE DETERMINANTS OF INCENTIVE-BASED COMPENSATION

This chapter provides a discussion and interpretation of the results for the
determinants of incentive-based compensation. Sections 6.1 through section 6.4 discuss
the effect of monitoring mechanisms on the determination of the level of incentive-based
compensation to REIT CEOs. Section 6.5 discusses findings on the interrelations
between incentive-based compensation, CEO ownership, and performance; and other
secondary results.
In general, monitoring and alignment mechanisms, such as CEO ownership, board
of directors, debt monitoring, and institutional or blockholders ownership, as well as
economic determinants, such as size, investment opportunities, total or idiosyncratic risk,
prior or current year performance, and leverage, have been found to affect CEO
compensation schemes. In this section, the results for the determinants of incentive-based
compensation for REITs CEOs are presented.
Panel A in Tables 6.1. and 6.2. shows the OLS results on the relation between
incentive-based compensation, measured either as the ratio of incentive-based
compensation to total compensation or as the natural log of the dollar amount of
incentive-based compensation, respectively, and economic and governance determinants.
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In addition to the pooled OLS results, panel B of Tables 6.1. and 6.2 presents the
2SLS regression results. The academic literature points out that compensation, firm
performance, and CEO stock ownership are endogenously determined. That is, the CEO
stock ownership may affect performance, but it can be a function of performance, too.
For example, in the scenario of good firm performance, the CEO may have the incentive
to increase his stock ownership in the firm, and as the CEO obtains more ownership in
the firm, he has more incentive to improve firm performance. In the same token,
endogeneity is possible between compensation and performance. Specifically, incentivebased compensation could be both a result of REITs previous performance and a factor
that influences subsequent performance. In this scenario, OLS results are unreliable
because of simultaneous equation bias.
To address endogeneity issues, a system of simultaneous equations with CEO
incentive based compensation, performance, and CEO ownership as the endogenous
variables is estimated. Economic determinants and other governance variables are treated
as exogenous variables. In order to solve the system, at least two exogenous variables
must be dropped from each equation so that the equation is identified. This relies on
theory or prior research to determine the exogenous variables to be included or excluded
in each of the equations. Following Ghosh and Sirmans (2005), the market capitalization
and the debt to equity variable are dropped from the compensation equations.15 Also,
institutional holdings and board size are dropped from the performance equations.

15

We acknowledge, as previous researchers have, that the exclusion of variables driven by the
identification requirement can result in unreliable results. However, this seems not to be the case in our
study because we drop alternative variables and run the models, as robustness checks, and the results for
both the compensation and performance equations stay the same.
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6.1. CEO Ownership
Agency literature suggests that CEO ownership in the firm serves as an alignment
mechanism between his interests and those of the shareholders. It is argued that in setting
compensation schemes, CEOs with share ownership would still agree to be paid
incentive-based compensation but at a reasonable level. Therefore, it is expected to find a
negative relation between CEO ownership and the level of incentive-based compensation
paid to CEOs.
Similar to Ghosh and Sirmans (2005), pooled regression results indicate that CEO
ownership is inversely related to incentive based compensation when incentive-based
compensation is measured as the natural log of incentive-based compensation to total
compensation. This could mean that CEOs with high stock ownership prefer cash
compensation over incentive-based compensation in order to reduce excessive exposure
of their personal wealth to the firm’s risk. However, when the measure of incentive-based
compensation is the natural log of total incentive-based compensation, the finding is no
longer statistically significant.
2SLS results confirm the pooled regression results. When incentive-based
compensation is measured as the natural log of the dollar amount of incentive-based
compensation, it is found that incentive-based compensation and CEO ownership are
inversely related for both measures of performance, REIT return on assets, and stock
returns. However, when incentive-based compensation is measured as the ratio of
incentive-based compensation to total compensation, CEO stock ownership is negatively
related to incentive-based compensation, but only in the case of returns on assets.
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6.2. Structure of the Board of Directors
The size and composition of the board may provide evidence of board
effectiveness and independency. Researchers argue that small boards are more efficient
than large boards because as board size increases, it becomes more difficult to coordinate
board actions, such as agreements on the level and type of compensation arrangements
for REIT CEOs. Therefore, it is expected to observe a positive relation between board
size and incentive-based compensation.
In addition, whether the CEO is chairman of the board is commonly considered a
measure of the influence of CEOs on boards. A CEO that chairs the board and has the
power to name directors is assumed to have more control on board decisions, for his own
benefit, than in the case where a CEO neither chairs the board nor appoints directors.
Therefore, it is expected to observe a positive relation between the CEO leading the
board and incentive-based compensation.
Panel A in Tables 6.1 and 6.2 provides results for the pooled regression models.
Unlike Ghosh and Sirmans (2005) and contrary to our expectations, it is found that board
size is inversely related to incentive based compensation. This implies that CEOs in
REITs with larger boards receive lower incentive-based compensation. Such a result goes
against the hypothesis that larger boards are less effective in monitoring activities and are
easier to control by the CEO. However, the case of REITs may be an exception.
Compared to the average twelve-member board for non-REITs, the average REIT board
with eight members is relatively small but within the optimal size range suggested by
Jensen (1993).
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The 2SLS results are consistent with our pooled regression results. When
incentive-based compensation is measured as the ratio of incentive-based compensation
to total compensation or the natural log of the dollar amount of incentive-based
compensation, the size of the board is found to be negatively related to incentive-based
compensation for both measures of performance.
With respect to the relation between the CEO serving as chairman of the board
and incentive-based compensation, the pooled regression results indicate a positive
relation between the CEO serving as chairman of the board and incentive-based
compensation. This is consistent with the idea that as the CEO has more power over the
board, he or she is more able to extract additional compensation.
Panel B in Tables 6.1 and 6.2 shows the 2SLS results when incentive-based
compensation is measured as the natural log of the dollar amount of incentive-based
compensation or the natural log of the dollar amount of incentive-based compensation,
respectively. For both measures of performance, CEO chairmanship of the board is found
to be positively associated to the level of incentive based compensation. Overall, these
results confirm the OLS results.
In addition, it is found a positive relation between the percentage of outside
directors in the board and incentive based compensation, when measured as the ratio of
incentive-based compensation to total compensation except in the case of 2SLS model
when return is the measure of performance. This result is plausible with the common
practice of independent directors to favor the award of incentive-based compensation in
the attempt to align managers and shareholders.
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6. 3 Debt Monitoring
Leverage is typically a control variable for agency costs of debt in non-REITs and
REITs compensation studies. However, it is believed that REITs provide an opportunity
to test for the monitoring benefits of debt rather than for controlling for agency cost of
debt. Given that REITs invest in tangible assets which make them less sensitive to
bankruptcy risk, are highly regulated firms, should prefer equity financing over debt
financing due that they do not obtain a tax shelter for the use of debt, and apparently have
low agency cost of debt, it is expected that debt is negatively related to incentive-based
compensation since debt monitoring is a substitute for incentive-based compensation.
Consistent with previous compensation literature for REITs, in both pooled and
2SLS regression results, it is found that debt is unrelated to incentive-based
compensation, consistent with previous compensation literature for REITs. This is a
peculiar result since it could be expected a leverage variable to capture either agency
costs of debt or debt monitoring power. As suggested by John and John (1993) and
Bryan, Nash, and Patel (2006), a possible explanation could be the lack of usage of
proxies that target agency problems better. However, the effect of CEO incentive-based
compensation on the agency costs of debt for REITs or a fancier measure for debt
monitoring constitute by themselves topics out of the scope of this dissertation (to be
addressed in further research efforts).

6.4. Institutional Ownership
Institutional shareholders are not subject to the five or fewer rule for REITs, are
permanent blockholders, and, thus, are able to control the level of incentive-based
61

compensation paid to CEOs; therefore, a negative relation between the level of incentivebased compensation paid to CEOs and institutional shareholdings is expected.
In the pooled regression results, it is found that institutional ownership is
positively related to incentive based compensation. The 2SLS results confirm such
findings, except when stock returns are the measure of performance. Overall, a positive
relation between incentive-based compensation and institutional holdings is inconsistent
with previous results for other types of compensation other than those reported by Ryan
and Wiggins (2000). Thus, the hypothesis that institutional shareholders monitor REIT
managers, thereby substituting for the role of incentive-based compensation is rejected.
Instead, there is evidence suggesting that institutional shareholders seek more incentivebased compensation to further align managers’ interests with their own.
In summary, the OLS and 2SLS results consistently support two of five
hypotheses; namely, incentive-based compensation is positively related to CEO
chairmanship and negatively related to CEO ownership. Still, there is no empirical
support for the remaining three hypotheses. Instead of a negative relation between debt
monitoring and incentive-based compensation, no relation was found. Also, the
hypotheses state a positive relation between board size and incentive-based compensation
and a negative relation between institutional holdings and incentive-based compensation,
but it was found, instead, that board size is negatively related to incentive-based
compensation and institutional holdings are positively related to it.
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6.5. Other results
Compared to the case of governance and alignment mechanisms, economic
determinants are less decisive determinants of the level of incentive-based compensation
paid to REIT CEOs. As shown in panel A of Table 6.1, when incentive-based
compensation is measured as the ratio of incentive-based compensation to total
compensation, no economic determinant is significantly related to incentive-based
compensation. That is, a REITs’ size, leverage, growth opportunities, and business risk
are unrelated to the level of REIT CEOs incentive-based compensation. In addition, REIT
property focus also does not impact the level of incentive-based compensation. In
contrast, as shown in panel A of Table 6.2, when incentive-based compensation is
measured as the natural logarithm of the total dollar amount of CEO incentive-based
compensation, REIT size impacts incentive-based compensation programs. Consistent
with most of the previous literature, the larger the firm, the more complex its operation,
and, thus, there is more need for using incentive-based compensation to align managers’
and shareholders’ interest. Interestingly, no other economic determinant is significantly
related to incentive-based compensation. That is, leverage, growth opportunities, and
business risk are unrelated to the level of a REIT CEOs incentive-based compensation. In
addition, incentive- based compensation turns out to be affected by property focus 16 for
all REITs but office REITs. Finally, the year on which incentive-based compensation is
awarded seems not to be important in any other case. This implies that the levels of
incentive based compensation are set independently of the market conditions.

16

The reference level is self-storage, following Scott, Anderson, and Loviscek (2001)
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The 2SLS results in panels B of Tables 6.1 and 6.2 generally support the pooled
results. 2SLS results also fail to show any relation between incentive-based compensation
and economic determinants. 17 The only point of contrast between pooled OLS and 2SLS
results is the loss of statistical significance for the health care, hotel, and residential
property focus dummies, when incentive-based compensation is measured as the natural
log of the total dollar amount of incentive-based compensation.
The results for the remaining equations in the 2SLS systems are as follows: REIT
performance (ROA) is negatively impacted by growth opportunities and leverage. In
addition, a REITs ROAs steadily decline over the years, as indicated by the negative and
significant sign of the year effect dummies. Specifically, REITs experienced lower ROAs
during the years of 2001 and 2002 compared to the ROA in the year 1999. Finally, ROA
is lower for hotel REITs compared to self-storage REITs. CEO ownership of company
stock is a decreasing function of board size and an increasing function of CEO
chairmanship. The latter may be due to the fact that many REITs CEOs are founders (or
related to the founders) who have accumulated an important ownership in the REITs over
the years.
As far as the results for the performance equation when stock returns are the
measure of REIT performance, it is found that only debt influences stock returns, and the
influence is negative. In addition, stock returns vary depending on the year; specifically,
they have been consistently better since year 1999. Finally, when incentive-based
compensation is measured as the ratio of incentive-based compensation to total
17

We could not verify the relation between REIT size and incentive-based compensation since, following
Ghosh and Sirmans (2005), we exclude MKTCAP, the proxy for REIT size, from the 2SLS models. The
reason is that MKTCAP seems to rob explanatory power to other explanatory and control variables
included in the models.
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compensation, hotel REITs stock returns turn out lower than stock returns for self-storage
REITs.
Finally, in the interrelation between incentive-based compensation, performance,
and CEO ownership, it is found that incentive-based compensation is, generally,
negatively impacted by CEO stock ownership, a result that is consistent with Ghosh and
Sirmans’ (2005) findings for the case of total compensation. However, unlike Ghosh and
Sirmans (2005), the results suggest no interrelation between incentive-based
compensation and performance. Thus, incentive-based compensation is set independently
to REIT performance, and it appears to not influence REIT performance. Interestingly,
the results suggest that performance, as measured by stock returns, positively impacts
CEO stock ownership.
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Table 6.1: Results for IBCOMP
Panel A: Pooled OLS
Predicted Effect
INTERCEPT
MKTCAP
ROA
SDROA
RETURN
SDRETURN
REINVEST
BSIZE
OUTSIDERS
CEOCHAIR
CEOOWN
INST
LTDE
YR00
YR01
YR02
YR03
Health Care
Hotel
Residential
Retail
Office
Industrial
Mixed
Adjusted R-Square
Observations

+
+
?
+
?
+
+
?
+
–
–
–
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?

Model 1
–43.984 (–1.15)
2.769 (1.49)
0.652 (0.93)
–0.363 (–0.31)

0.059 (0.84)
–1.737 (–2.33)**
0.292 (2.54)**
0.067 (2.37)**
–0.195 (–1.33)
0.273 (3.64)***
0.007 (0.08)
4.398 (1.04)
3.672 (0.85)
1.374 (0.32)
1.244 (0.29)
10.932 (1.22)
1.060 (0.12)
1.023 (0.13)
5.658 (0.73)
–3.128 (–0.38)
12.438 (1.41)
8.235 (0.98)
0.134
390

Model 2
–41.266 (–1.14)
2.910 (1.59)

0.084 (1.18)
–0.663 (–0.62)
0.051 (0.73)
–1.777 (–2.38)**
0.272 (2.36)**
0.069 (2.43)**
–0.202 (–1.38)
0.262 (3.45)***
–0.008 (–0.09)
4.006 (0.96)
0.600 (0.12)
–1.907 (0.39)
–1.015 (–0.23)
12.350 (1.39)
1.182 (0.13)
0.903 (0.11)
5.223 (0.67)
–2.881 (–0.35)
13.149 (1.49)
8.296 (0.99)
0.136
390

This table presents pooled OLS (panel A) and 2SLS (panel B) estimates for the models considered. The
dependent variable is IBCOMP, the incentive based compensation as a percentage of total compensation.
MKTCAP is the natural logarithm of total capitalization; ROA is the ratio of net income (before
extraordinary items) to average assets, and SDROA is the standard deviation of ROA over the last three
years. RETURN is the 1-year cumulative stock return, using daily stock return data, and SDRETURN is the
standard deviation of one-year daily stock returns. REINVEST is the ratio of Net Property Investment to
Funds from Operations. BSIZE is the number of directors in the board’ OUTSIDERS is the percentage of
outside directors out of the total number of directors in the board; CEOCHAIR is an indicator variable that
equals one if the CEO leads the board of directors, zero otherwise, and CEOOWN is the CEO’s share
ownership as a percentage of the total outstanding shares. Finally, INST is the percentage of outstanding
shares owned by institutional investors, and LTDE is the ratio of total long-term debt to total capitalization.
YR 00, YR 01, YR02, and YR03 are binary variables that have value one for observations in years 2000,
2001, 2002, and 2003 respectively, and 0 otherwise. Finally, Health Care, Hotel, Residential, Retail, Office,
Industrial, and Mixed are dummy variables for a REITs property focus. Statistical significance is displayed
by the use of one (10%), two (5%), or three (1%) stars.
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Table 6.1. Continued
Panel B: 2SLS
INTERCEPT
Endogenous variables
IBCOMP
ROA
CEOOWN
Exogenous variables
MKTCAP
REINVEST
LTDE
BSIZE
OUTSIDERS
CEOCHAIR
INST
YR00
YR01
YR02
YR03
Health Care
Hotel
Residential
Retail
Office
Industrial
Mixed
Adjusted R-Square
Observations

IBCOMP
31.742 (1.23)

ROA
14.328 (2.60)***
0.008

0.779 (0.34)
–2.203 (–1.44)*

0.075

(0.84)

–3.034 (–1.94)*
0.262 (1.86)*
0.137 (2.25)**
0.220 (1.83)*
4.686 (0.95)
4.700 (0.91)
2.466 (0.45)
2.664 (0.45)
2.813 (0.24)
–2.135 (–0.18)
0.979 (0.10)
20.445 (1.32)
2.919 (0.25)
12.485 (1.22)
15.812 (1.33)
0.081
390
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(0.53)

CEOOWN
16.663 (2.95)***
–0.139 (–1.43)
0.522 (0.72)

–0.014 (–0.17)
–0.381 (–1.52)
–0.010 (–1.96)*
–0.046 (–7.21)***
–0.009 (–0.93)
–0.003 (–0.78)
0.128 (0.42)
–0.315 (–1.03)
–0.712 (–2.31)**
–0.963 (–3.14)***
1.060 (1.38)
–1.354 (–2.08)**
–0.322 (–0.55)
0.023 (0.03)
–0.032 (–0.05)
0.469 (0.68)
0.538 (0.80)
0.260
390

0.025
–0.818
–0.021
0.040
–0.022

(0.53)
(–3.18)***
(–0.38)
(3.04)***
(–0.59)

0.083
390

Table 6.1. Continued
Panel B: 2SLS
INTERCEPT
Endogenous variables
IBCOMP
RETURN
CEOOWN
Exogenous variables
MKTCAP
REINVEST
LTDE
BSIZE
OUTSIDERS
CEOCHAIR
INST
YR00
YR01
YR02
YR03
Health Care
Hotel
Residential
Retail
Office
Industrial
Mixed
Adjusted R-Square
Observations

IBCOMP
39.947 (1.51)

RETURN
49.640 (0.89)
0.214

0.172 (0.33)
–2.280 (–1.40)

0.056

(0.63)

–3.052 (–1.92)*
0.230 (1.46)
0.143 (2.10)**
0.208 (1.58)
3.708 (0.65)
-1.526 (-0.09)
-3.981 (-0.23)
-1.489 (-0.14)
4.871 (0.38)
–1.410 (–0.11)
0.444 (0.05)
19.612 (1.31)
2.903 (0.24)
12.780 (1.21)
15.500 (1.31)
0.078
390
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(1.33)

CEOOWN
19.292 (5.25)***
–0.118 (–1.35)
0.097 (3.00)***

–0.231 (–0.27)
–3.123 (–1.23)
0.056 (1.08)
–0.210 (–3.20)***
0.079 (0.78)
–0.031 (–0.84)
5.421 (1.74)*
34.254 (10.97)***
34.195 (10.94)***
19.934 (6.39)***
–11.681 (–1.50)
–11.378 (–1.72)*
1.487 (0.25)
8.706 (1.10)
2.557 (0.40)
–1.822 (–0.26)
5.217 (0.76)
0.386
390

0.012
–0.831
–0.043
0.039
–0.033

(0.39)
(–3.27)***
(–0.80)
(3.23)***
(–1.01)

0.104
390

Table 6.2. Results for LOG-IBCOMP
Panel A: Pooled OLS
Predicted Effect
INTERCEPT
MKTCAP
ROA
SDROA
RETURN
SDRETURN
REINVEST
BSIZE
OUTSIDERS
CEOCHAIR
CEOOWN
INST
LTDE
YR00
YR01
YR02
YR03
Health Care
Hotel
Residential
Retail
Office
Industrial
Mixed
Adjusted R-Square
Observations

+
+
?
+
?
+
+
?
+
–
–
–
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?

Model 1
2.750 (1.00)
0.313 (2.36)**
0.060 (1.20)
0.074 (0.88)

0.003 (0.63)
–0.109 (–2.05)**
0.011 (1.32)
0.006 (2.85)***
–0.032 (–3.02)***
0.025 (4.75)***
–0.001 (–0.22)
0.469 (1.56)
0.469 (1.53)
0.390 (1.26)
0.388 (1.26)
2.076 (3.26)***
1.447 (2.31)**
1.199 (2.08)**
1.767 (3.20)***
0.835 (1.42)
2.075 (3.31)***
2.132 (3.55)***
0.238
390

Model 2
3.917 (1.51)
0.289 (2.21)**

0.003 (0.67)
–0.067 (–0.87)
0.002 (0.37)
–0.112 (–2.09)**
0.009 (1.14)
0.006 (2.85)***
–0.033 (–3.16)***
0.025 (4.50)***
–0.003 (–0.54)
0.380 (1.28)
0.251 (0.72)
0.148 (0.42)
0.199 (0.62)
2.226 (3.50)***
1.449 (2.31)**
1.207 (2.09)**
1.765 (3.17)***
0.927 (1.56)
2.139 (3.40)***
2.180 (3.62)***
0.236
390

This table presents pooled OLS (panel A) and 2SLS (panel B) estimates for the models considered. The
dependent variable is LOG-IBCOMP, the natural logarithm of the total dollar amount of CEO incentive
based compensation. MKTCAP is the natural logarithm of total capitalization; ROA is the ratio of net
income (before extraordinary items) to average assets and SDROA is the standard deviation of ROA over
the last three years. RETURN is the 1-year cumulative stock return, using daily stock return data, and
SDRETURN is the standard deviation of one-year daily stock returns. REINVEST is the ratio of Net
Property Investment to Funds from Operations. BSIZE is the number of directors in the board;
OUTSIDERS is the percentage of outside directors out of the total number of directors in the board;
CEOCHAIR is an indicator variable that equals one if the CEO leads the board of directors, zero otherwise,
and CEOOWN is the CEO’s share ownership as a percentage of the total outstanding shares. Finally, INST
is the percentage of outstanding shares owned by institutional investors and LTDE is the ratio of total longterm debt to total capitalization. YR 00, YR 01, YR02, and YR03 are binary variables that have value one
for observations in years 2000, 2001, 2002, and 2003, respectively, and 0 otherwise. Finally, Health Care,
Hotel, Residential, Retail, Office, Industrial, and Mixed are dummy variables for a REITs property focus.
Statistical significance is displayed by the use of one (10%), two (5%), or three (1%) stars.
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Table 6.2. Continued
Panel B: 2SLS
INTERCEPT
Endogenous variables
IBCOMP
ROA
CEOOWN
Exogenous variables
MKTCAP
REINVEST
LTDE
BSIZE
OUTSIDERS
CEOCHAIR
INST
YR00
YR01
YR02
YR03
Health Care
Hotel
Residential
Retail
Office
Industrial
Mixed
Adjusted R-Square
Observations

IBCOMP
11.148 (5.04)***

ROA
13.357 (2.75)***
0.097

0.114 (0.58)
–0.248 (–1.89)*

0.004

(0.56)

–0.245 (–1.84)*
0.008 (0.64)
0.013 (2.55)**
0.019 (1.89)*
0.411 (0.98)
0.503 (1.14)
0.446 (0.95)
0.510 (1.01)
1.214 (1.22)
1.197 (1.21)
1.217 (1.44)
3.354 (2.53)**
1.550 (1.55)
2.047 (2.34)**
2.936 (2.90)***
0.099
390
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(0.53)

CEOOWN
25.167 (2.83)*
–0.839 (–0.99)
0.248 (0.39)

–0.006 (–0.08)
–0.376 (–1.53)
–0.010 (–1.93)*
–0.046 (–7.15)***
–0.008 (–0.89)
–0.003 (–0.83)
0.126 (0.41)
–0.324 (–1.05)
–0.732 (–2.37)**
–0.988 (–3.16)***
0.970 (1.15)
–1.478 (–2.06)**
–0.430 (–0.67)
–0.149 (–0.18)
–0.165 (–0.25)
0.372 (0.47)
0.374 (0.49)
0.261
390

0.018
–0.729
–0.056
0.034
–0.041

(0.40)
(–3.06)***
(–1.27)
(3.01)***
(–1.23)

0.091
390

Table 6.2. Continued

Panel B: 2SLS
INTERCEPT
Endogenous variables
IBCOMP
RETURN
CEOOWN
Exogenous variables
MKTCAP
REINVEST
LTDE
BSIZE
OUTSIDERS
CEOCHAIR
INST
YR00
YR01
YR02
YR03
Health Care
Hotel
Residential
Retail
Office
Industrial
Mixed
Adjusted R-Square
Observations

IBCOMP
12.350 (5.33)***

RETURN
24.813 (0.51)
2.477

0.025 (0.56)
–0.259 (–1.82)*

0.002

(0.20)

–0.248 (–1.78)*
0.003 (0.23)
0.014 (2.37)**
0.018 (1.54)
0.268 (0.53)
-0.409 (-0.26)
-0.499 (-0.32)
-0.098 (-0.11)
1.515 (1.37)
1.303 (1.13)
1.139 (1.37)
3.232 (2.46)**
1.548 (1.49)
2.091 (2.26)**
2.890 (2.79)***
0.089
390
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(1.34)

CEOOWN
27.412 (3.14)***
–0.962 (–1.15)
0.098 (3.14)***

–0.027 (–0.03)
–2.996 (–1.21)
0.062 (1.21)
–0.204 (–3.11)***
0.118 (1.32)
–0.037 (–0.98)
5.383 (1.74)
34.023 (10.91)***
33.679 (10.80)***
19.319 (6.11)***
–13.993 (–1.64)
–14.547 (–2.00)**
–1.281 (–0.20)
4.319 (0.52)
–0.837 (–0.12)
–4.299 (–0.54)
1.022 (0.13)
0.390
390

0.018
–0.742
–0.067
0.036
–0.040

( 0.60)
(–3.12)***
(–1.52)
(3.26)***
(–1.25)

0.109
390

CHAPTER 7
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Even though incentive-based compensation has grown to comprise an important
part of REIT CEOs total pay, incentive-based compensation has not been explicitly
studied yet for Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs). Besides, in an agency framework,
the alignment role of incentive-based compensation remains an empirical question for
REITs. The fact that REITs are subject to strict regulations, in exchange for corporate tax
exemption, may affect a REITs compensation practices in two ways. On one hand, REIT
managers may be better monitored than their counterparts in other, industries making it
unnecessary to rely on incentive-based compensation. On the other hand, regulations can
negatively affect REITs corporate governance mechanisms and, thus, make incentivebased compensation a key alignment mechanism for a REITs CEOs.
This dissertation tested the effect of incentive based compensation on REIT
performance. Specifically, it was tested the alignment hypothesis, that of incentive-based
compensation being positively related to long-term performance.

In addition, this

dissertation built on Ghosh and Sirmans’ (2005) models to examine the determinants of
the level of incentive-based compensation paid to REIT CEOs, but focusing on the role
of institutional shareholdings rather than on the role of block holders’ holdings.
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Contrary to the expectations, this study did not find a positive relation between
compensation and long-term subsequent performance. Instead, it found a negative
relation between subsequent stock return and previously awarded incentive based
compensation.

Interestingly,

no

relation

was

found

between

incentive-based

compensation and performance when ROA is the measure of performance. The result for
the case of stock returns is consistent with the findings of Pennathur, Gilley, and Shelor
(2005) in the relation between change in stock returns and stock option awards but
inconsistent with agency theory and other findings (e.g. Ryan and Wiggins, 2000; Scott,
Anderson, and Loviscek, 2001). Consequently, the evidence supports the interpretation
that there is a need to limit incentive-based compensation paid to REIT CEOs in order to
improve REIT performance.
As far as the determinants of incentive based compensation, the study finds that
CEO ownership, whether the CEO chairs the board or not, board size, and institutional
ownership are consistent determinants of the level of incentive based compensation
awarded to REIT CEOs. Specifically, CEO ownership and board size are found to be
negatively related to incentive-based compensation, while, whether the CEO chairs or not
and institutional holdings are positively related to incentive-based compensation. In
addition, the study finds that debt monitoring is unrelated to the level of incentive-based
compensation paid to REIT CEOs. Finally, the study finds limited evidence that retail,
industrial, and mixed REITs pay more incentive-based compensation to their CEOs than
self-storage REITs.
In summary, this dissertation was started by asking two specific questions. First,
does incentive-based compensation affect subsequent REIT performance? The answer is,
73

yes, it does because incentive-based compensation is negatively related to subsequent
REIT performance. Second, what are the determinants of incentive-based compensation?
The answer is that CEO stock ownership, board size, CEO chairmanship, and
institutional holdings consistently determine the level of incentive-based compensation
paid to REIT CEOs.
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